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M A G G I E  M C K I N L E Y  
Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative 
State 
abstract.  The administrative state is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. Many have ques-
tioned the legality of the myriad commissions, boards, and agencies through which much of our 
modern governance occurs. Scholars such as Jerry Mashaw, Theda Skocpol, and Michele Dauber, 
among others, have provided compelling institutional histories, illustrating that administrative 
lawmaking has roots in the early American republic. Others have attempted to assuage concerns 
through interpretive theory, arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 implicitly 
amended our Constitution. Solutions offered thus far, however, have yet to provide a deeper un-
derstanding of the meaning and function of the administrative state within our constitutional 
framework. Nor have the lawmaking models of classic legal process theory, on which much of our 
public law rests, captured the nuanced democratic function of these commissions, boards, and 
agencies. 
 This Article takes a different tack. It begins with an institutional history of the petition pro-
cess, drawn from an original database of over 500,000 petitions submitted to Congress from the 
Founding until 1950 and previously unpublished archival materials from the First Congress. His-
torically, the petition process was the primary infrastructure by which individuals and minorities 
participated in the lawmaking process. It was a formal process that more closely resembled litiga-
tion in a court than the tool of mass politics that petitioning has become today. The petition process 
performed an important democratic function in that it afforded a mechanism of representation for 
the politically powerless, including the unenfranchised. Much of what we now call the modern 
“administrative state” grew out of the petition process in Congress. This Article offers three case 
studies to track that outgrowth: the development of the Court of Claims, the Bureau of Pensions, 
and the Interstate Commerce Commission. These case studies supplement dynamics identified 
previously in the historical literature and highlight the integral role played by petitioning in the 
early administrative state—a role unrecognized in most institutional histories. Rather than simply 
historical, this excavation of the petition process is distinctly legal in that it aims to name the peti-
tion process and to connect it with the theory and law that structure the practice. 
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 Excavating the historical roots of these myriad commissions, boards, and agencies in the pe-
tition process provides a deeper functional and textual understanding of the administrative state 
within our constitutional framework. First, it highlights the function of the administrative state in 
facilitating the participation of individuals and minorities in lawmaking. By providing a mecha-
nism of representation for individuals and minorities, the “participatory state” serves as an im-
portant supplement to the majoritarian mechanism of the vote. Second, it offers new historical 
context against which to read the text of Article I and the First Amendment. This new interpreta-
tion could begin to calm discomfort, at least in part, held by textualists and originalists with regard 
to the administrative state. Lastly, this Article offers a few examples to illustrate how this new 
interpretation could provide helpful structure to our administrative law doctrine. With its concern 
over procedural due process rights, administrative law largely reflects the quasi-due process pro-
tections offered by the Petition Clause. This Article explores two areas where the Petition Clause 
could direct a different doctrinal result, arguing for a stronger procedural due process right for 
petitioners of the administrative state than that offered by Mathews v. Eldridge and arguing against 
the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha holding the legislative veto unconstitutional. 
author.  (Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Ojibwe) Assistant Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. I owe a great debt to my Co-Principal Investigator, Dan Carpenter, and 
the research team who together created the Congressional Petitions Database: Benjamin Schneer, 
Tobias Resch, Joseph Breen, Justin Connor, Jonathan Hansen, Caroline Lauer, Sarah Murphy, 
Jesse Shelburne, and Jason St. John. I am deeply grateful for their brilliance and ingenuity over the 
last three years, and grateful that they took a chance on a Harvard fellow with a novel idea. Harvard 
Law School, the Ash Center for Democratic Governance, and the Radcliffe Institute for Academic 
Ventures provided generous, and much needed, support. For close reads, critical insights, and 
helpful suggestions, my thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Janet Alexander, Ian Ayres, Shyam Balganesh, 
Jack Balkin, Stephanos Bibas, Cary Coglianese, Glenn Cohen, Phil Deloria, Chris Desan, Yaseen 
Eldik, Einer Elhauge, Bill Eskridge, Dick Fallon, Noah Feldman, Matthew Fletcher, Charles Fried, 
Gary Gerstle, Abbe Gluck, John Goldberg, Sally Gordon, Jamey Harris, Lawrence Lessig, Ken 
Mack, Serena Mayeri, Bill Novak, Karen Orren, Nick Parrillo, Juan Perea, Robert Post, Daphna 
Renan, Dorothy Roberts, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bill Rubenstein, David Schleicher, Rebecca 
Scott, Daniel Sharfstein, Wenona Singel, Joe Singer, Ganesh Sitaraman, Stephen Skowronek, 
Henry Smith, Kevin Stack, Karen Tani, Alexander Tsesis, Adrian Vermeule, Jim Whitman, Michael 
Wishnie, Tobias Wolff, and Andrew Yaphe. Like language, ideas are not cultivated in isolation. For 
ongoing discussions and support, my thanks to Greg Ablavsky, Monica Bell, Dan Carpenter, Guy-
Uriel Charles, Ryan Doerfler, Laura Edwards, Heather Gerken, Naomi Lamoreaux, Sophia Lee, 
John Manning, Martha Minow, and Ben Schneer. Ned Blackhawk, nimiigwichiwendam endaso-
giizhik maamawi, ninimoshe. Chi-miigwech nimaamaa gi-mashkawizii. This manuscript bene-
fited from numerous faculty workshops, and I am grateful to each for their hospitality. These ideas 
were also tempered through discussion and occasionally heated debate at the Tobin Project’s con-
ference on the History of American Democracy, USC’s Political Economy and Public Law Confer-
ence, and the “Friday Seminar” at Penn’s McNeil Center for Early American Studies. I am endlessly 
grateful to the editorial team at the Yale Law Journal—led by Leslie Arffa, R. Henry Weaver, Kyle  
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introduction 
[The right to petition] would seem unnecessary to be expressly provided for in 
a republican government, since it results from the very nature of its structure 
and institutions. It is impossible that it could be practically denied until the 
spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people had become so servile 
and debased as to be unfit to exercise any of the privileges of freemen.  
– Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (1833)
1
 
Our government is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy.
2
 As James O. Freed-
man has described, Americans have endured a “recurrent sense of crisis” over 
whether the procedures of administrative lawmaking accord with the Constitu-
tion.
3
 Classic legal process theory reminds us that recurring crises in the public’s 
faith in our lawmaking procedure undermines the legitimacy of our laws.
4
 Re-
cent scholarship by Gillian Metzger declares the administrative state to be “under 
siege” across a “range of public arenas—political, judicial, and academic in par-
ticular.”
5
 Metzger argues that these challenges—unlike earlier challenges to the 
administrative state—are frequently “surfacing in court and being framed in 
terms of constitutional doctrine.”
6
 Moreover, the constitutional issues raised by 
 
1. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A PRE-
LIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE 
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1894, at 645 (William S. Hein & Co., 5th ed. 1994) 
(1891). 
2. The legitimacy debate often centers not around a “thick normative notion” of legitimacy, but 
that of sociological and public legitimacy. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Con-
stitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005); see also Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism 
and Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 394, 395 (Samuel Freeman 
ed., 2003) (considering the “conditions of the possibility of political legitimacy in modern, 
plural societies”); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (discussing how procedural fairness increases the perceived legiti-
macy of judicial proceedings). 
3. JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 260 (1978). 
4. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994); see also Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair 
Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809, 809 
(1994) (finding that empirical studies “strongly support the argument that procedural justice 
judgments influence evaluations of the legitimacy of a national-level political institution”). 
5. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (2017). 
6. Id. at 9. 
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these challenges are not piecemeal. Rather, the challenges frame the entire ad-
ministrative state as unconstitutional.
7
 “While still a minority position,” Metzger 
observes, “this view is gaining more judicial and academic traction than at any 
point since the 1930s.”
8
 
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule identified this nascent movement in 
charting the creation of “libertarian administrative law.”
9
 This strain of critique 
characterizes the administrative state as an abandonment of both classical Amer-
ican liberalism and the core values of our “Constitution in Exile”—namely, indi-
vidual rights, limited national government, and due process.
10
 Critics take issue 
with the abandonment of the strict, tripartite separation of powers embodied in 
constitutional text for the so-called “Fourth Branch”—a branch not recognized 
by the text of our original Constitution.
11
 By Sunstein and Vermeule’s account, 
the administrative state has become a lightning rod for the clash between liber-
tarian and progressive philosophies
12
 in our increasingly polarized political cul-
ture.
13
 
Given the philosophical cast of much of the critique, it is unsurprising that 
it has been met with rebuttals based in intellectual history. Most recently, legal 
historian Daniel R. Ernst examined the intellectual origins of the New Deal and 
argued that an intellectual consensus of elites and their expressly liberal concerns 
over due process should put to rest any charge that the administrative state is out 
of step with liberal American values.
14
 Even assuming Ernst’s careful archival 
 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393 
(2015). Although Sunstein and Vermeule document a recent strain of doctrine animated by 
judicial critics of the administrative state, Vermeule has made clear his position that “the ad-
ministrative state has never been more secure” and that any questions of administrative law 
legitimacy are cabined to “elite discourse” only. Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: 
Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2017); see 
also Adrian Vermeule, What Legitimacy Crisis?, CATO UNBOUND (May 9, 2016), http://www
.cato-unbound.org/2016/05/09/adrian-vermeule/what-legitimacy-crisis [http://perma.cc
/44JE-RQ22] (“[I]t is hardly obvious that there is any widespread illegitimacy afflicting the 
administrative state . . . .”). 
10. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 402-03. 
11. Id. at 403-09. 
12. Id. 
13. Notably, Sunstein and Vermeule also call for an administrative law proceduralism devoid of 
politics eerily reminiscent of the process school. See id. at 466. 
14. DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN 
AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014). Sunstein and Vermeule clothe the same moment of consensus in 
constitutional theory and describe the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 as 
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work could document an intellectual consensus,
15
 however, it is doubtful that 
such a moment of agreement could overcome the core of the libertarian critique: 
that is, the lack of constitutional text establishing the lawmaking procedure of 
the administrative state by formal means.
16
 
Other defenders of the administrative state have provided institutional his-
tories undermining the libertarians’ claim that the administrative state is an alien 
outgrowth of a twentieth century communitarian political philosophy foreign to 
our founding constitutional culture. Jerry Mashaw,
17
 Theda Skocpol,
18
 Nicholas 
Parrillo,
19
 Michele Dauber,
20
 and Daniel Carpenter,
21
 among others, have begun 
the vital project of excavating legislative and executive practices during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. This work contradicts previous descriptions of 
that era as one encompassing only a weak “state of courts and parties.”
22
 It has 
generally interrogated the mismatch between particular values previously under-
stood as originating with the New Deal—like that of social welfare
23
—and the 
 
an example of what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have labeled a “superstatute”—
namely, a statute that assumes the authority of constitutional law by virtue of a strong con-
sensus at its passage—pointing to compromise over the bill as evidence that administrative 
law stripped the liberal-communitarian debate from its core. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 
9, at 466. 
15. See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718 (2016) 
(reviewing Ernst’s book). 
16. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 
(1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional.”); see also PHILIP HAM-
BURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) (arguing the same). 
17. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). 
18. THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL 
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1995). 
19. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (2013). 
20. MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2013). 
21. DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATION, NETWORKS, 
AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001). 
22. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL AD-
MINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 285 (1982); Daniel P. Carpenter, The Multiple and Ma-
terial Legacies of Stephen Skowronek, 27 SOC. SCI. HIST. 465, 470 (2003). 
23. In particular, Skocpol and Dauber take aim at the charge that the welfare programs of the New 
Deal represent the colonization of the American mind by twentieth-century communitarian-
ism. They offer a revisionist history that traces the origins of the welfare practices of the New 
Deal to the war pensions, disaster relief, and other forms of social insurance offered readily by 
early American national government. DAUBER, supra note 20; SKOCPOL, supra note 18. 
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reality of historical practice. But nothing has done more to undermine the char-
acterization of the administrative state as an alien outgrowth of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century than the work of Jerry Mashaw. 
Mashaw’s impressive installments in the Yale Law Journal, later compiled into 
a book, trace the practices of American administrative governance to the found-
ing.
24
 Mashaw’s administrative state, if such a term still applies, is an incremen-
talist project that was built statute by statute as Congress met new challenges 
with new forms of governance.
25
 His rich historical narrative problematizes the 
libertarian critique that our Founding witnessed little national administrative 
governance and adhered to a strict separation of powers.
26
 It remains unclear, 
however, whether Mashaw’s account sufficiently addresses the critique that these 
new forms of lawmaking procedure were never formally established. To many, 
historical practice alone does not amend the Constitution.
 
This Article aims to build on Mashaw’s incrementalist narrative and to inter-
vene in the debate over the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking. But unlike 
these prior contributions, it grounds this intervention in the Constitution and in 
constitutional text—namely, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. Draw-
ing on an original database of over 500,000 petitions submitted to Congress, as 
well as archival materials from the First Congress, this Article excavates the pe-
tition process comprehensively for the first time and documents how petitioning 
shaped the modern administrative state. This excavation tracks petitioning in 
the House of Representatives from the First Congress through the Eightieth, at 
which point the volume of legislative petitioning dropped dramatically following 
 
24. MASHAW, supra note 17. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy”: Administra-
tive Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinafter Mashaw, 
Administration and “the Democracy”]; Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of Federal Admin-
istrative Law: Remembering the First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975 (2010); 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 
1356 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Law in the Gilded Age]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering Ameri-
can Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican 
Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007). 
25. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 16 (“At the most general level I imagine the development of our 
administrative constitution as a waltz, a three-step pattern often repeated. First, something 
happens in the world. Second, public policy makers identify that happening as a problem, or 
an opportunity, and initiate new forms of governmental action to take advantage of or to rem-
edy the new situation. Third, these new forms of action generate anxieties about the direction 
and control of public power. Means are thus sought to make the new initiative fit within ex-
isting understandings of what it means to be accountable to law.”). 
26. Id. 
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implementation of the Legislative Reorganization Act and the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946.
27
 
In doing so, this Article offers three primary contributions to the debate. 
First, it provides a revisionist history of the administrative state as an outgrowth 
of the petition process by detailing congressional petitioning from the Founding 
into the twentieth century. Second, it updates legal process theory to incorporate 
petitioning and its integral role in affording participation for individuals and mi-
norities in the lawmaking process. Third, this Article argues that the Petition 
Clause could offer additional support for the constitutionality of the administra-
tive state. But just as excavating the petitioning process reveals the historical and 
textual roots of the administrative state, it also demonstrates that our doctrine 
has migrated quite far from those origins. This history, then, also sheds lights 
on how this doctrine could better reflect the important constitutional and dem-
ocratic function that the administrative state performs in supplementing the 
congressional petition process. 
*** 
Although largely lost from our modern understanding of lawmaking, the in-
stitution of petitioning formed a core part of our Congress for much of this na-
tion’s history. The petition process performed an important lawmaking function 
within colonial legislatures in allowing the aggrieved to be heard. After the rev-
olution, the petition process provided a mechanism of representation for indi-
viduals and minorities not represented by the majoritarian mechanism of the 
vote. Even the unenfranchised could petition: women, free African Americans, 
Native Americans, the foreign born, and children turned to the petition process 
to participate in lawmaking. 
The petition process offered the politically powerless a means of participa-
tion that was formal, public, and not driven by political power. In this way, the 
petition process resembled litigation in a court more closely than the rough and 
tumble public engagement process described by political scientists today. Peti-
tioners would submit formal documents, like complaints, to trigger petition ac-
tions in Congress. The House clerk tracked these actions in a petition docket 
book throughout formal proceedings—from submission to referral to reporting 
to disposition. Although the petition process was primarily located in the House, 
 
27. In so doing, this Article challenges the widely held conclusion in the historical literature that 
the petition process “died out” in the nineteenth century as a result of either the Gag Rule, 
administrability problems, or other procedural changes in Congress. See Maggie L. McKinley, 
Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1153 n.146 (2016) (surveying the de-
bate). 
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the consideration of petitions dominated congressional dockets into the twenti-
eth century—often far surpassing the volume of congressional business on other 
matters. 
The petition process formed an integral part of our congressional lawmaking 
process until after the Second World War. The year 1945 marked not only the 
end of the war, but also the beginning of a comprehensive effort to restructure a 
government that had rapidly expanded under a series of wartime administra-
tions. As part of this effort, Congress passed two laws in the summer of 1946 
that fundamentally restructured the federal lawmaking process: the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)
28
 and the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA).
29
 
Histories of the administrative state rarely treat these two statutes together,
30
 but 
they were passed only months apart and their effects were felt in tandem. To-
gether, these statutes dismantled the last vestiges of the petition process in Con-
gress. In so doing, they transferred much of that existing infrastructure to the 
administrative state and to the courts. In particular, the LRA reduced the number 
of standing committees in Congress—once the core loci for petition review and 
processing—and banned the passage of certain private bills that Congress had 
used to resolve petitions. The APA transferred jurisdiction over these petitions 
explicitly to the courts and the executive—most notably through the Federal Tort 
Claims Act—and attempted to strengthen congressional oversight of the agen-
cies.
31
 Finally, the APA codified procedural standards for the agencies to ensure 
protection of the petition right, including a provision requiring a petition pro-
cess in the agencies. 
These two statutes did not themselves cause the decline of the petition pro-
cess in Congress. Rather, they dismantled an infrastructure rendered vestigial 
after Congress siphoned off the petition process into specialized boards, com-
missions, and agencies.
32
 This siphoning can be seen across a range of substan-
tive areas, including public lands, Indian affairs, military affairs, public infra-
structure, regulation and incorporation of the territories, post offices and roads, 
labor, education, agriculture, immigration, and election administration.
33
 
 
28. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
29. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
30. See JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE 
THE NEW DEAL 109-152 (2014) (providing a recent and rare exception). 
31. Id. 
32. See infra Section I.C (“Following a steady decline in petition volume after 1914, when special-
ized agencies and boards mushroomed after World War I, Congress finally dismantled the 
last vestiges of the congressional petition process with the passage of two statutes.”). 
33. Id. 
petitioning and the making of the administrative state 
1549 
Over time, the resulting assortment of boards, commissions, and agencies 
has come to be pejoratively referred to as the “Fourth Branch”—denoting a mys-
terious entity not recognized by our tripartite constitutional structure. But, as 
this Article will demonstrate, the administrative state traces its roots to constitu-
tional text and historical practice—specifically to siphoning off of the petitioning 
process—and performs many of the functions originally managed by that pro-
cess.
34
 However, to date, there has been little research on the petition process in 
Congress, and few scholars have explored the implications of this process and 
the Petition Clause for the theory and law of the administrative state. 
That history, recovered here, has broad implications. Most relevant for cur-
rent debates over the administrative state’s legitimacy, it offers a counter-narra-
tive to the libertarian vision of the administrative state as a rights-invading, and 
even unconstitutional, construction. Instead, this history reveals an administra-
tive state that was established, at least in part, to protect individual rights and to 
maintain equal liberty by affording individuals and minorities a mechanism for 
meaningful participation in the making of law.
 35
 
This counternarrative also exposes flaws in the overly simplistic model of 
legal process theory. This theory of lawmaking, popularized in the 1950s and 
1960s, still animates much of our public law scholarship and jurisprudence. The 
libertarian vision rests on this imperfect theory. The simple legal process model 
provides only a thin account of the lawmaking process and fails to capture the 
necessity of facilitating equal participation to ensure equal liberty.
36
 In so doing, 
 
34. Part I details this process, but I include a brief introduction here for ease of understanding. At 
the Founding and for much of this nation’s history, petitioning provided a formal means by 
which anyone, including the unenfranchised, could access the lawmaking process. Women, 
Native Americans, African Americans, and the foreign-born all engaged in petitioning, and 
Congress provided formal consideration to all. Petitioners submitted a variety of petitions to 
Congress, each comprising a formal document with a statement of grievance and a signatory 
list, and often attached maps, charts, draft statutory language, and other forms of argumen-
tation to the document. Much like a complaint filed in a court, the legislative petitioning pro-
cess was public: members of Congress read each petition on the floor and then referred the 
petition to either the executive, an ad hoc committee, or one of the many standing committees 
specific to the subject matter of the petition. Action on each petition was recorded into the 
formal record of Congress, and standing committees kept dockets of action on petitions. The 
authority to which the petition was referred would then issue a report on the petition with a 
recommendation for resolution. Some studies place the documented reporting rate as high as 
sixty or seventy percent. Congress would then take action on the report, choosing to pass a 
bill, public or private, in response to the petition, or the committee might deny the petition 
and take no further action. McKinley, supra note 27, at 6-7.   
35. See infra Part II. 
36. HART & SACKS, supra note 4; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2050 & n.116 (noting the 
near absence of any discussion of representation, elections, direct democracy, or any concern 
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legal process theory perpetuates the misconception that equality and liberty are 
supported only by the “rights” side of the Constitution. It overlooks how the 
structural and procedural components of the lawmaking process also promote 
those values.
37
 Scholars of critical legal studies recognized over fifty years ago 
that the legal process theory model of lawmaking fails to take account of the need 
to accommodate and protect individuals and minorities within the lawmaking 
process.
38
 Incorporating petitioning and other recent scholarship on the struc-
tural protection of minority participation
39
 into our model of lawmaking begins 
to answer these longstanding criticisms. 
Finally, the history of petitioning and the Petition Clause offers further sup-
port for the constitutionality of the administrative state. As I have described else-
where, the petition right protects formal, public, and nonarbitrary access to the 
lawmaking process without regard to the political power of the petitioner and 
resembles the right of procedural due process in courts.
40
 The administrative 
state and the doctrine that has developed around it already embody the Petition 
Clause values of fair, public, and nonarbitrary process.
41
  For textualists and 
originalists, the Petition Clause could provide the textual hook necessary to calm 
recurrent anxieties over administrative lawmaking.
42
 For others, the Petition 
Clause offers a new framework to understand the dynamics at work in Con-
gress’s translation of the petition right into the modern state, and its historical 
practice could bring clarity to administrative law doctrine more broadly.
43
 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the burgeoning histor-
ical literature on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century governance and points to 
disputes left unresolved by these histories. It provides context for understanding 
the Petition Clause before turning to the Congressional Petitions Database. This 
 
with structural protections for minorities and minority representation in the original Legal 
Process manuscript). 
37. Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 587, 594 & n.29 (2015). 
38. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 214-18 (1987); Eskridge & 
Frickey, supra note 4, at 2050-51. 
39. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Heather K. 
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as 
the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, New Na-
tionalism]; Gerken, supra note 37, at 594; Maria Paula Saffon & Nadia Urbinati, Procedural 
Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty, 41 POL. THEORY 441, 443-45 (2013). 
40. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-85. 
41. See infra Section IV.B (noting that “the quasi-procedural due process right of the kind prom-
ised by the Petition Clause” protects values such as equality, transparency, and participation”). 
42. See infra Section IV.A (discussing how the Petition Clause offers a textual hook for many of 
the innovative forms of governance we now call the administrative state). 
43. Id. 
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Part then provides an overview of congressional petitioning from the Founding 
until 1948.  
Next, Part II illustrates the siphoning off of the petition process with three 
case studies. The first is roughly termed “adjudicative” and tracks the origins of 
the federal claims system from the petition process to the Court of Claims and 
the federal courts. The next, termed “public benefits,” tracks the pension system 
from the Committees on Pension to the Bureau of Pensions. The final “regula-
tory” case study tracks the regulation of commerce from the Commerce and 
Manufactures Committees to the executive—most notably the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. 
Part III begins to articulate what I term the “participatory state” and situates 
petitioning and the administrative state within the theoretical literature—legal 
process theory, in particular—as a structural protection for minority participa-
tion in the lawmaking process.  
Part IV then turns to the critics of the administrative state and shows how 
their criticisms rest largely on the simple, and incomplete, tripartite separation-
of-powers model of legal process theory. Part IV argues that excavating the ori-
gins of the administrative state in the petition process adds nuance to these sim-
ple models and resolves concerns over the “amorphous” constitutional status of 
the administrative state. Next, Part IV studies how this more nuanced model 
could justify the stickiness of the legislative veto
44
—a procedure whereby Con-
gress authorized one chamber to overturn administrative action—despite the Su-
preme Court’s holding the procedure unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha.
45
 In the 
original petition process, a single chamber could deny a petition even in the ab-
sence of bicameralism and presentment. Furthermore, viewing the administra-
tive state through the lens of the Petition Clause provides a textual basis for the 
doctrine of administrative due process first established in the Morgan v. United 
States cases.
46
 Lastly, Part IV explores some potential objections before conclud-
ing. 
i .  origins 
Why is so much attention paid to trifling memorials? . . . And why should we 
support men at Congress to trifle away their time upon them? 
 
44. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 
(1993). 
45. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
46. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938). 
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The answer to questions of this kind is obvious. Justice is uniform. It is the same 
when administered to an individual, a state, or a nation . . . . There is a mutual 
dependence between the supreme power and the people. And since the whole 
government is composed of individuals, does it appear inconsistent that indi-
viduals should be heard in the public councils? . . . In order to gain the confi-
dence of the people they must be fully convinced that their memorials and peti-
tions will be duly attended when they are not directly repugnant to the interest 
and welfare of the community. – Candidus, Gazette of the United States (June 
5, 1790)
47
  
A. The Rediscovery of Early American Lawmaking 
With the publication of Building a New American State in 1982, Stephen 
Skowronek issued a clarion call to scholars of politics and law to refocus their 
attention not only on political history, but also on the institutions and institu-
tional practice that operated within this history.
48
 The state-centered and histor-
ical turn in political science modeled by Skowronek ushered in a renaissance in 
the study of early American administrative development. According to Jerry 
Mashaw, this movement has transformed our understanding of “law” in the field 
of administrative law to incorporate more than the decisions of courts.
49
 
Theda Skocpol crafted one of the earliest and undoubtedly most thorough of 
these institutional histories of the administrative state in Protecting Soldiers and 
Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States.
50
 But while 
Skocpol’s history traces the administrative state’s roots to the postbellum pen-
sion system, twenty years later, Michele Dauber pushed Skocpol’s revisionist his-
tory back to the Founding.
51
 In The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Or-
igins of the Modern Welfare State, Dauber traces the disaster rhetoric used to 
support relief for the Great Depression back to the First Congress and the na-
tional government’s program of disaster relief appropriations.
52
  Dauber de-
scribes a disaster relief system that began with the petition process in Congress 
and then expanded over time to commissions, established by general legislation, 
 
47. Candidus, Extract from a Speculation Signed Candidus in the Farmer’s Journal of May 27, 2 GA-
ZETTE U.S. 477, 477 (1790). 
48. SKOWRONEK, supra note 22. 
49. MASHAW, supra note 17. 
50. SKOCPOL, supra note 18. 
51. DAUBER, supra note 20. 
52. Id. at 1-16. 
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charged with resolving petitions emanating from specific disasters.
53
 Congress 
located its power to develop these disaster relief systems in the General Welfare 
Clause of the Constitution.
54
 
Ironically, some of the institutional histories responding to Skowronek’s call 
have turned these methods against Building a New American State itself—in par-
ticular, its claim that nineteenth-century America was a state of “courts and par-
ties” devoid of administrative infrastructure. Daniel Carpenter charted the early 
formation and evolution of the United States Department of Agriculture and the 
United States Postal Service in The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, 
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies 1862-1928.
55
 Nicholas Par-
rillo recently documented the salary scheme that allowed for early administrative 
structures to function over loose networks of private individuals in Against the 
Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780-1940.
56
 
Mashaw himself offered perhaps the strongest revisionist history against the 
“courts and parties” image in his survey of early American governance. Mashaw 
documents the growth of national administration—“the development and im-
plementation of law and policy by officials specifically charged with that respon-
sibility”—from the Founding Era until the Gilded Age.
57
 His revisionist narra-
tive lays to rest the notion that the administrative state was born in 1887 with the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Across his hundred-year survey, Mashaw of-
fers a number of case studies, including the first Board of Patents, the land claims 
system, steamboat regulation, and Civil War pensions.
58
 
Mashaw notes that his identification of early American administration is con-
tingent on a necessary shift in methodology.
59
 In particular, his work avoids tra-
ditional event-centered administrative history and instead focuses “on practice, 
structure, and policy, not on social movements, political rhetoric, or legal justi-
fication.”
60
 With this inquiry, Mashaw identified “transsubstantive ideas in the 
patterns of legislative and administrative action, not in the language of political 
debate, academic analysis, or legal doctrines generated by judicial review.”
61
 It is 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 19-20. 
55. CARPENTER, supra note 21. 
56. PARRILLO, supra note 19. 
57. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 16. 
58. Id. at 50, 119, 187, 256. 
59. Id. at 3-17. 
60. Id. at 16. 
61. Id. (defining “transsubstantive ideas” as features shared across substantive areas of the law). 
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among these transsubstantive practices,
62
 those that predate and were codified 
into the APA, that Mashaw hopes to locate administrative law or what he terms 
“the internal law of administration.”
63
 
As was the case with Dauber’s disaster relief system and Skocpol’s pension 
review, Mashaw often describes these administrative practices as disparate activ-
ities that share characteristics but not a common root. In this Article, I aim to 
name a transsubstantive pattern in the practice, structure, and policy of early 
American lawmaking—patterns relating to petitioning. Petitioning has often oc-
cupied an unnamed but central role in the background of these institutional his-
tories. Dauber’s first chapter, for example, begins with a description of the “pri-
vate bill” system in Congress,
64
 a petition system that she argues gave birth to 
our welfare state. Petitions also play a recurring role in Mashaw’s survey.
65
 
Skocpol’s Civil War pension system derived from and operated within the peti-
tion process.
66
 But none of the three has wholly excavated petitioning and the 
implications of this practice for understanding the development of our modern 
administrative state. 
My aim in naming, identifying, and exploring petitioning as a transsubstan-
tive practice is not only historical—it is also legal. First, I aim to describe peti-
tioning in sufficient depth to reveal it as a particular transsubstantive practice 
that has been lost to our modern parlance. Our modern familiarity with voting, 
for example, allows us to more clearly see patterns of relation between settings. 
Thus, variations in voting practice, such as raising a hand in one setting and 
marking a ballot in another, are nonetheless still seen as voting practices, and not 
 
62. I offer here a friendly amendment to Mashaw’s methodological turn toward transsubstantive 
ideas and patterns of action. Here, I instead focus firmly on transsubstantive practice. Akin to 
the act of naming petitioning, this methodological move changes little in the substance of the 
analysis. Rather, it roots Mashaw’s methodology squarely in practice theory—alongside the 
works of Bourdieu, Wittgenstein, and other theorists of the structure-agency divide—where 
it might gain deeper insights. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 
78-79 (Richard Nice trans., 1977) (“The ‘unconscious’ is never anything other than the for-
getting of history which history itself produces by incorporating the objective structures it 
produces in the second natures of habitus: ‘ . . . in each of us, in varying proportions, there is 
part of yesterday’s man; it is yesterday’s man who inevitably predominates in us, since the 
present amounts to little compared with the long past in the course of which we were formed 
and from which we result. Yet we do not sense this man of the past, because he is inveterate 
in us; he makes up the unconscious part of ourselves.’” (quoting EMILE DURKHEIM, L’ÉVOLU-
TION PEDAGOGIQUE EN FRANCE 16 (1938))). 
63. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 7. 
64. DAUBER, supra note 20, at 17. 
65. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 3-25. 
66. SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 102-51. 
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as unrelated acts. The petition process to date has only been documented in 
sparse and disparate terms—the private bill system in one setting, meeting with 
a congressman in another, and petitioning an agency under the APA in yet an-
other. Naming petitioning and giving it shape will allow us to more readily iden-
tify it across these settings, and relate the practices to their transsubstantive ori-
gins. 
Second, and most important, I aim to connect this transsubstantive practice 
with the theory and law that structure it.
67
 The founding generation saw this 
process as an integral part of a republican form of government. It fostered rep-
resentation of the entire demos, including the unenfranchised, and served as a 
counterpoint to the majoritarian electoral process.
68
 From its earliest days, Con-
gress devoted an extraordinary amount of time and resources to institutionaliz-
ing and maintaining the right to petition.
69
 Behind the particular transsubstan-
tive practice of petitioning and the text of both Article I and the Petition Clause 
are bodies of theory and law on which these institutional histories have yet to 
reflect. 
B. The Petition Process in Congress 
In the winter of 1799, the Reverend Absalom Jones joined seventy other Af-
rican American petitioners in signing and submitting to the Sixth Congress “The 
Petition of the People of Colour, Freemen within the City and Suburbs of Phila-
delphia.”
70
 As was customary, the petitioners submitted the petition to their own 
representative. To introduce the petition to Congress, Representative Robert 
Waln of Pennsylvania read the petition aloud on the floor of the House.
71
 Their 
petition read, in pertinent part: 
The Petition of the People of Colour, Freemen within the City and Sub-
urbs of Philadelphia— . . . . That thankful to God our Creator and to the 
Government under which we live, for the blessing and benefit extended 
to us in the enjoyment of our natural right to Liberty, and the protection 
of our Persons and property from the oppression and violence which so 
great a number of like colour and National Descent are subjected . . . . 
 
67. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-86. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Nicholas P. Wood, A “Class of Citizens”: The Earliest Black Petitioners to Congress and Their 
Quaker Allies, 74 WM. & MARY Q. 109, 111 (2017). 
71. Id. at 136. 
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We are incited by a sense of Social duty and humbly conceive ourselves 
authorized to address and petition you in their behalf, believing them to 
be objects of representations in your public Councils, in common with 
ourselves and every other class of Citizens within the Jurisdiction of the 
United States, according to the declared design of the present Constitu-
tion . . . . We apprehend this solemn Compact is violated by a trade car-
ried on in clandestine manner to the Coast of Guinea . . . .
72
  
In the body of the petition, the petitioners identified as their grievance an illegal 
slave trade market functioning off the coast of Guinea, in violation of the 1794 
Slave Trade Act.
73
 In their “prayer” or request for resolution of their grievance, 
the petitioners prayed that Congress “may exert every means in [its] power to 
undo the heavy burdens, and prepare the way for the oppressed to go free.”
74
 As 
was customary, Representative Waln then moved to refer the petition to a com-
mittee in Congress for investigation, review, and reporting.
75
 
Although the petition garnered northern support, southern congressmen 
moved quickly to block the referral and reject the petition entirely.
76
  The 
grounds for the motion to reject the petition might come as a surprise, however. 
Rather than take issue with the race of the petitioners, the southern congressmen 
raised a procedural objection: petitions to Congress were to be rejected as im-
properly filed when the petition prayed for a remedy that fell outside of Con-
gress’s jurisdiction.
77
 In addition to praying for regulation of the international 
slave trade, the petitioners also prayed for regulation of domestic slavery. Regu-
lation of slavery was widely accepted at the time as falling squarely within the 
jurisdiction of the several states. In response, Representative Waln amended his 
motion to direct the committee to address only those aspects of the petition 
clearly within the authority of Congress—regulation of the international slave 
trade.
78
 Recent research by historian Nicholas P. Wood has revealed that, con-
trary to the prevailing literature,
79
 the amended motion to refer the petition was 
 
72. Absalom Jones et al., The Petition of the People of Colour, Freemen within the City and Sub-
urbs of Philadelphia (Dec. 30, 1799), reprinted in SIDNEY KAPLAN, THE BLACK PRESENCE IN THE 
ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 273, 273-75 (1973). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Wood, supra note 70, at 137. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 137-38. 
78. Id. at 137. 
79. Id. at 113-14. Historians had mistakenly read the vote on whether to refer to a committee the 
emancipation grievance of the petition, which was dismissed, as a vote on whether to refer 
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“resolved in the affirmative.”
80
 The reviewing committees considered the griev-
ance alleged in the petition and each reported favorably that Congress should 
grant the petition.
81
 Both chambers of Congress agreed, and, five months fol-
lowing the submission of the petition, Congress drafted and passed the Slave 
Trade Act of 1800,
82
 increasing the penalties for engaging in the slave trade and 
holding liable those who participated even indirectly—including investors, em-
ployees, and the like.
83
 
The process by which this politically powerless minority successfully advo-
cated for reform once comprised an integral part of lawmaking in Congress. 
While historians often draw on petitions as archival materials on which to base 
their research, a comprehensive institutional history of the petition process has 
yet to be written. The archival work required to conduct a thorough history of 
the petition process in Congress has to date proved too burdensome for most 
scholars of Congress and of political history. The First Congress, for example, 
received approximately 600 petitions, and the historians of the First Federal 
Congress Project filled two of their twenty volumes of the Documentary History 
of the First Federal Congress with summaries of these petitions and their disposi-
tions. One volume focused entirely on petitions for Revolutionary War claims.
84
 
The original congressional petitions and supporting documents remain un-
published and often unavailable, stored on microfilm in the National Archives. 
Moreover, these efforts catalogue only the First Congress. The volume of peti-
tioning in later Congresses only increased, and petition records often fill the ar-
chives of entire congressional committee records. 
There is an alternative means to study the petition process without having 
access to the original archival materials: the congressional record. From the 
Founding onward, petitions submitted to Congress were read aloud on the floor, 
and a summary of the petition was made part of the formal record. Collaborators 
at the North American Petition Project and I have used digitized versions of the 
Congressional Record and Journal to build the Congressional Petitions Database, 
 
the entire petition, including all grievances. Because historians read this earlier vote as one to 
dismiss the petition entirely, not simply in part, they missed the second vote, which resolved 
in the affirmative the question of whether to refer the international slave trade grievance to 
committee for review. Id. at 113-14, 137-38. 
80. Id. at 138 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-245 (1800)). 
81. Id. at 138-39. 
82. Ch. 51, § 4, 2 Stat. 70. 
83. Wood, supra note 70, at 139. 
84. 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMER-
ICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, at 232-33 (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1998) [herein-
after DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8]. 
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a database of all petition introductions to Congress from the Founding until the 
present.
85
 Exploration of this Database is still in its earliest stages, but it reveals 
a petition process far more comprehensive, institutionalized, and enduring than 
heretofore documented. The following institutional history draws in part from 
this Database, supplemented with archival research into the papers of the First 
Congress and secondary sources. 
The petition process had deep roots in American lawmaking procedures. 
While the framing generation mythologized American petitioning in Magna 
Carta and the petition of right, colonial and state governments had long devel-
oped a distinctly American form of petitioning.
86
 Petitioning has played an inte-
gral role within legislatures throughout history.
87
 In Parliament, the terms bill 
and petition were often used interchangeably.
88
 It is speculated that Parliament 
itself was simply an institutionalization of the petition process.
89
 Petitioning was 
ubiquitous throughout colonial legislatures and often drove legislative agen-
das.
90
 
As I have discussed in prior work, the American colonists conceived of them-
selves as an unrepresented and unenfranchised minority, and they based their 
 
85. More on the methodology behind the Database and its limitations can be found in the Meth-
ods Appendix. But I provide a brief description here of the Database to provide context for 
the sections that follow. We first developed algorithms to locate and separate out petition in-
troductions from the Congressional Record and Journal. We then coded these petition introduc-
tions for geographic, demographic, and topical content. 
86. See Christine A. Desan, Remaking Constitutional Tradition at the Margin of the Empire: The Cre-
ation of Legislative Adjudication in New York, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 257 (1998) (documenting 
the usurpation of public claims adjudication by colonial legislatures as a distinctly American 
constitutional innovation); see also Daniel Carpenter, Democracy by Petition 1-68 (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (documenting the rise of a distinct form of Amer-
ican petitioning, the spread of participatory democracy, and the abolition of aristocracy in the 
antebellum era correlating with a ubiquitous peak in petitioning activity).  
87. Id. at 1142-47 (chronicling the extensive use of petitioning from Magna Carta to the early Re-
public). 
88. K. Smellie, Right of Petition, in 12 ENCYLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98, 98 (Edwin R.A. 
Seligman ed., 1937). 
89. Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Griev-
ances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 20-21 (1993) (outlining the 
centrality of petitioning in Parliament). 
90. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right To Petition the Government for Redress 
of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986). 
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claimed right to a distinct American sovereignty in the Declaration of Independ-
ence on the failure of the petitioning process.
91
 The founding generation then 
codified protection of the petition right into their constitutions, both state and 
federal.
92
 The right protected by the Petition Clause was strictly procedural. It 
protected a right not to a particular legislative outcome, but a right to equal, for-
mal, and public access to the lawmaking process akin to the right of procedural 
due process.
93
 
The petition process also provided an underappreciated avenue for political 
participation distinct from the vote. The process was available to even the unen-
franchised and did not operate by a majoritarian decision rule. Through the pe-
tition process, aggrieved individuals and minorities could articulate their griev-
ances and pray for redress, even in the absence of a particular cause of action.
94
 
The mechanism of American petitioning was thus open to equal participation by 
all—politically powerful and powerless alike. The unenfranchised—women, Na-
tive Americans, and non-enslaved African Americans—were afforded process on 
par with franchised petitioners. Congress received, before the end of the Civil 
War, a steady influx of petitions submitted by the unenfranchised. From 1789 
until 1865, of 145,892 total petitions, Congress introduced 10,131 petitions 
(6.9%) submitted by primary signatories who were unenfranchised. Of these 
10,131, women submitted 9,258 petitions (91.38%),
95
 Native Americans submit-
ted 569 petitions (5.62%), foreign nationals submitted 180 petitions (1.78%), 
and African Americans submitted 124 petitions (1.22%).
96
  Because Congress 
 
91. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1142-43 (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S. 
1776) (“In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most hum-
ble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.”)). 
92. Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right To Petition, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2199-2212 (1998) (recounting the constitutionalization of the right 
to petition in state and federal constitutions). 
93. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1145 (explaining how the petition process increased political access 
for otherwise marginalized groups). 
94. Id. 
95. Not only were the petitions themselves an important and effective lawmaking technology for 
the unenfranchised, the act of petitioning often caused second-order effects on unenfran-
chised communities and empowered later, more comprehensive petitioning campaigns. See 
Daniel Carpenter & Colin D. Moore, When Canvassers Became Activists: Antislavery Petitioning 
and the Political Mobilization of American Women, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 479 (2014). 
96. These figures are drawn from the Congressional Petitions Database. They likely understate 
the number of petitions that included participation of the unenfranchised, because the data 
include only those petitions where an unenfranchised petitioner was listed as the primary pe-
titioner and the member petition introduction noted the demographics of the petitioner. Ag-
gregating the unenfranchised from petition introductions would not capture all of the peti-
tions where an unenfranchised petitioner was one of many signers. It also bears noting that 
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treated petitions from the unenfranchised like all other petitions and did not de-
marcate them in any way, they are challenging to track in the record and these 
numbers are likely quite understated. 
The relative political power and characteristics of any individual petitioner 
did not drive petition procedure, nor did petitions with fewer signatures receive 
different or lesser process. The petition process thus afforded a means of partic-
ipation for the politically powerless. The process was also formal. Parliamentary 
rules governed the procedure by which petitions were received, investigated, and 
reported, and a petitioner knew the process to expect in response to a petition. 
Like a court, the clerk’s office in the House kept a docket book that tracked each 
petition from submission to reporting to disposition. Finally, the petition pro-
cess in Congress was presumed to be a public process. All petition introductions 
were read in full on the floor, making them part of the formal legislative record, 
and subsequent action on a petition was similarly recorded.
97
 Petitioning served 
a vital role in lawmaking and ensured a more egalitarian form of participation in 
the lawmaking process. 
C. The Infrastructure of Petitioning 
The practice of petitioning developed by Parliament and refined in the colo-
nial and state legislatures formed an early and important aspect of lawmaking in 
the First Congress. Indeed, petitioning constituted such a fundamental compo-
nent of lawmaking that the establishment and formalization of the petition pro-
cess occurred less than one week after the House of Representatives achieved its 
first quorum on April 1, 1789.
98
  Before the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, the popularly elected House was closer to the electorate, and it re-
mains to this day the sole originator of revenue bills—a common resolution of 
petitioners’ grievances. Not surprisingly, the House also quickly became the pri-
mary chamber for the bulk of petitioning activity.
99
 On April 6, 1789, both cham-
bers of Congress met to count the votes of the Electoral College and confirm the 
election of George Washington as the first President of the United States.
100
 The 
procedures governing petitioning were reported on the second page of the 
 
these figures do not capture white male non-landholders who were also excluded from the 
franchise. 
97. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84. 
98. 1 A Record of the Reports of Select Committees of the House of Representatives of the United 
States (1789) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the National Archives, Index to Com-
mittee Reports, Executive Reports, 1st Congress, 2d Session, Record Group 233.2) [hereinaf-
ter A Record of the Reports of Select Committees]. 
99. Id. 
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House Record of the Reports of Select Committees, the record documenting 
Congress’s earliest parliamentary procedures. Only several pages later did the 
House address such fundamental procedures as how to present bills to the Pres-
ident for signature or establish conference committees. The first executive de-
partments—State, War, and Treasury, respectively—were established even later. 
The petition process established by the First Congress resembled more 
closely the formalized and routinized litigation of a court than a tool of mass 
politics. Of note, this newly institutionalized petition process embodied the val-
ues of transparency and fairness found in judicial procedure. Each petition sub-
mitted to a member of Congress or the clerk would be “introduced” into Con-
gress. Under the newly established parliamentary procedures in the House, the 
Speaker or a member in his place would present a petition on the day of its in-
troduction: 
Petitions, memorials, and other papers addressed to the House shall be 
presented through the Speaker, or by a member in his place, and shall 
not be debated or decided on the day of their being first read, unless 
where the House shall direct otherwise, but shall lie on the table, to be 
taken up in the order they were read.
101
 
To introduce a petition, the Speaker or member would read the entire petition 
on the House floor. Following this full recitation, a summary of the petition 
would become part of the House Journal, the record of Congress published reg-
ularly and made available for the public.
 
Then the petition would be “tabled”—
or held in the queue, seemingly without time limit—to be taken up for further 
consideration in the order the petition was received.
102
 
Following introduction, petitioning followed a standard four-stage process: 
referral, investigation, reporting, and disposition. Petitions were most often re-
ferred to a committee within Congress with jurisdiction over the petition or, al-
ternatively, to the executive, most commonly the Secretary of the Treasury or the 
Secretary of War, for investigation of the grievances alleged in the petition. 
Within Congress, committees—either standing or select—became the locus of 
petition processing.
103
 Following referral, the committee or executive official to 
 
101. Id. 
102. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xvi. 
103. From the First Congress, the petition process shaped lawmaking infrastructure within the 
Congress—largely through the development of ad hoc and standing committees. See Tobias 
Resch et al., Petitions and the Legislative Committee Formation: Theory and Evidence from 
Revolutionary Virginia and the Early U.S. House 24 (Jan. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/news/pdf/CongressHistory-PetitionsCommitteeFormation
_SchneerReschCarpentrMcKinley.pdf [http://perma.cc/59MS-RMXT]. The process also 
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whom the petition was referred would conduct an investigation and complete a 
report that included factual and legal findings and a recommended disposition, 
all of which were recorded in full in the record for select committees or for each 
standing committee.
104
 Following the issuance of such a report, either a subcom-
mittee within Congress or a committee of the whole—a committee consisting of 
the entire membership of one chamber—would then review the report and de-
cide on the disposition, including proposing a bill or resolution to redress the 
petitioner’s grievance.
105
 
Petitions themselves were drafted as formal documents that resembled a 
complaint. Each petition followed certain conventions of form and structure—
including an addressee (a petition title summarizing the names of the petition-
ers); a petition topic (a formal statement of grievance outlining the issue at 
hand); a prayer for relief; and a signature list.
106
 
The archival records for the First Congress reveal an even more institution-
alized and formalized petition process than the parliamentary procedures of each 
chamber betray. Beginning with the First Congress, the House of Representa-
tives maintained a detailed docket of all petitions submitted, sorted by session 
and by Congress.
107
 Published for the first time in the pages that follow, the pe-
tition docket of the First Congress, like a court docket, tracked all important pro-
cedural considerations of the petition. These included the date the petition was 
 
defied modern notions of separation of powers with ready reliance on the executive and the 
courts. 
104. Id. at 19. 
105. A Record of the Reports of Select Committees, supra note 98; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 
8, supra note 84, at xvii. 
106. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xviii-xix. Each petition would often begin 
by stating to whom the petition was addressed—the House of Representatives or the Senate, 
for example—and failure to state the correct addressee was grounds to refuse to receive a pe-
tition entirely. The prayer for relief was then expected to state the specific relief sought in clear 
and detailed terms. Failure to include sufficient detail articulating the specific relief requested 
could result in Congress’s treating the petition as “informational” only. Petitioning Congress 
also required deferential language. Throughout the statement of grievance and prayer, the 
petition’s text was expected to be respectful, and the failure to frame the petition in sufficiently 
deferential language was often a means to challenge receipt of the petition. The statement of 
grievance and prayer would then be followed by a signatory list that could range from a “list” 
of a single signature to one including hundreds of thousands of signatures. Id. at xix-xx. 
107. An Alphabetical List of Petitions Presented to the House of Representatives from the Com-
mencement of the First Congress to the End of the Second Session of the Third Congress with 
the Proceedings Thereon (1789) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the National Ar-
chives, Petition Book, 1st Congress, 1st Session - 3d Congress, 2d Session, Record Group 233). 
Committees, standing and select, also kept similar petition dockets within their own record 
books. 
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presented, the petitioners’ identities, the date and location of the petition refer-
ral, the report date, additional procedures after the report was issued, and the 
disposition. Within the docket book sections, petitions were listed alphabetically 
by the organizational name or surname of the primary petitioner. The petition 
docket listed petitions from unenfranchised petitioners in exactly the same man-
ner as all other petitioners and without demarcation. Although each petition was 
docketed by Congress and by session, the petition book detailed future action on 
each petition across Congresses. 
The investigation and reporting practices for processing petitions involved 
detailed and thorough factfinding. Reports on petitions ranged from succinct 
partial-page reports stating that the grievance alleged in the petition was barred 
by a statute of limitations to reports in excess of ten pages, with detailed charts, 
calculations, and factual findings.
108
 
Each stage of the petition process complicates our modern view of what leg-
islatures do—namely, make laws. More often than not, processing petitions in-
volved an amalgam of legislating, adjudicating, and enforcing. For example, one 
of the first reports issued by a select committee addressed two petitions for in-
tellectual property protection submitted by John Churchman and David Ramsay 
and received within weeks of the convening of the First Congress.
109
 In response, 
the House formed one of its earliest select committees, which issued a report five 
days following referral.
110
 In the report, the committee mentions specifically that 
it conferred with at least one of the petitioners, Churchman, in formulating the 
approximately one-page report, which was recorded into the formal log for the 
select committees of the House. In this way, the petition process in Congress 
blended legislative and adjudicative functions, and resembled proceedings in a 
court more closely than the purely political forces we imagine animate the law-
making process. 
The petition process therefore qualifies our modern view of Article I law-
making. Decisions on petitions created a wide array of “laws”—general laws, pri-
vate laws, individual commission decisions, and decisions by congressional com-
mittees. Resolution of petitions at times involved passing public laws through 
the traditional means of bicameralism and presentment.
111
 But more often, re-
solving a petition involved what would today be perceived as nontraditional law-
making—processes which at the Founding were viewed as equally within Con-
gress’s power to control. To illustrate, petition declinations were not considered 
 
108. A Record of the Reports of Select Committees, supra note 98. 
109. Id.; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xi-xxvii. 
110. A Record of the Reports of Select Committees, supra note 98. 
111. Id. 
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“legislative acts” that would require bicameralism and presentment.
112
 If the re-
port on a petition recommended against redressing the petitioner’s grievance—
or was “reported against,” to use the parlance of the period—Congress often de-
ferred to the committee or executive’s expertise and declined to act on the peti-
tion.
113
 Denial of a petition’s request for resolution of grievance did not require 
the passage of any law. Committees therefore issued declinations without the 
passage of any bill, thereby avoiding the requirements of bicameralism and pre-
sentment.
114
 Committees also occasionally provided the petitioner the oppor-
tunity to withdraw petitions that were improperly filed or were suspected as 
fraudulent.
115
 
Favorable disposition of pending petitions most often took one of two forms. 
If the report recommended redress of the petitioner’s grievance, the committee 
would often propose a bill or resolution that Congress would pass through the 
traditional lawmaking procedures of bicameralism and presentment. Alterna-
tively, Congress could employ the unique authority held at the Founding to pass 
“private laws,” or laws that applied to a single individual or case—much like a 
court judgment. The chosen method depended on the grievance alleged and the 
relief prayed for in the petition. While private laws were commonly used to re-
dress petitions for claims, pensions, contracts, intellectual property, and other 
government benefits,
116
 the relationship between petitions and private laws was 
complex. The earlier mentioned Ramsay and Churchman petitions for intellec-
tual property provide a helpful illustration of this relationship. 
Following issuance of the committee report on the Ramsay and Churchman 
petitions, the House first initiated debate on the report. After that debate, where 
portions of the report were “tabled” or left to be resolved by future committees, 
the House consented to the report.
117
 It is unclear why the House declined to 
adopt the legislative practice common in the states, under which private bills 
would have granted Ramsay and Churchman intellectual property protection for 
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id.; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xi-xxvii. 
116. See List of the Private Acts of Congress, in 6 THE PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1789; TO MARCH 3, 1845 
iii (Richard Peters ed., 1848); see also id. at 943-91 (compiling an index of the beneficiaries and 
purposes of private laws).  
117. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 
AIPLA Q.J. 445, 458 (1997). 
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their described inventions. However, the House had from its very first days ex-
pressed concerns over its capacity to process petitions on a case-by-case basis.
118
 
Instead of simply granting the petitioners the relief they sought, the House ap-
pointed another committee on April 20, 1789—just 19 days following the first 
quorum—to draft and bring a bill or bills for a public law, “making a general 
provision for securing authors and inventors the exclusive right of their respec-
tive writings and discoveries.”
119
 
Two months later, the committee reported out a bill that would form the 
basis for the first Patent Act, signed into law on April 10, 1790 by President 
George Washington. The Act established the general infrastructure for patent 
protection and, specifically, it established a three-member commission to resolve 
petitions for patents that would exist independent of the petition process in Con-
gress.
120
 These early intellectual property petitions illustrate how Congress ad-
dressed petitions focused on individual interests not only through private bills 
but also by establishing new structures of governance through general legisla-
tion. 
An in-depth examination of the petition procedures in the early Congresses 
complicates our simple notions of the legislative process. The petition process 
began and was institutionalized in earnest within the first days of Congress. Ra-
ther than a simple process of members introducing and passing bills through 
deliberation, bicameralism, and presentment, lawmaking in Congress was in-
credibly complex. Members could introduce bills, but the public engaged in the 
lawmaking process also and suggested bills through their petitions. The investi-
gation and reporting aspects of the petition process involved functions that 
looked more adjudicatory than legislative. The processing of exceptions and 
working out the nuanced application of general laws looked more executive. 
Moreover, Congress began to build out the infrastructure of the petition process 
 
118. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xv. 
119. Walterscheid supra, note 117, at 458. During its deliberations on the Patent Act, Congress con-
tinued to receive petitions for patent protection, but these petitions were tabled until Congress 
passed the Patent Act and the petitioners submitted their petitions pursuant to the terms of 
the Act. Thereby, Congress dealt with the petitions in aggregate by establishing infrastructure 
to resolve petitions of that kind in the future. The national government did not begin to re-
solve petitions for patents until July 30, 1790, when it granted the first federal patent to Sam-
uel Hopkins of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. President Washington and two Patent Commis-
sion members signed Hopkins’s patent and, unlike the grant of an intellectual property 
monopoly through a private bill, the grant did not require bicameralism and presentment. See 
P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 237, 244-45 (1936). 
120. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109. This independent commission comprised the Secretary of War, 
the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. It could approve a patent with the approval 
of two of its members and later formed the basis for the Patent and Trademark Office. Id. 
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into the other branches. In addition to relying upon the other branches for fact-
finding and administration, Congress began to establish entirely new structures 
of governance to resolve petitions. The next Sections will give a better sense of 
the volume of the petition process and show how it dominated Congress’s docket 
for decades. 
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FIGURE 1. 
PETITION DOCKET BOOK COVER – FIRST CONGRESS TO THIRD CONGRESS, 1789 
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FIGURE 2. 
PETITION DOCKET BOOK – SECOND CONGRESS, 1791-1793 
 
D. The Rise and Fall of Congressional Petitioning 
1. Petitioning the Early Congress (1789-1795) 
The petition process had already been firmly institutionalized in colonial and 
state legislatures by the time that the First Congress cracked open the doors of 
the just-renovated Federal Hall in New York City in early spring of 1789.
121
 Pe-
titioners had climbed the steps of Federal Hall before when it served as the meet-
ing place of the Confederation Congress.
122
 The Articles of Confederation had 
established a petition process of its own, and the Confederation Congress often 
 
121. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xvi-xvii; FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST 
CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE WASHINGTON, AND A GROUP OF EXTRAORDINARY 
MEN INVENTED THE GOVERNMENT 25-26 (2016). 
122. BORDEWICH, supra note 121, at 2. 
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worked closely with the executive to resolve certain petitions.
123
 Following rati-
fication of the new Constitution, petitioners wasted no time in navigating this 
familiar terrain to submit their petitions to the new Federal Congress. 
The First Congress received 621 petitions: 598 to the House and 23 to the 
Senate.
124
 The House continued to receive the majority of petitions—an average 
of 78% of the petition volume—over the next one hundred and fifty years, from 
the First Congress (1789-1791) to the Eightieth (1947-1949).
125
 
Petitions in the early Congresses alleged grievances on a range of issues, and 
the process defied modern notions of separation of powers from its earliest days. 
From the First Congress to the end of the first session of the Fourth Congress, 
1,887 petitions were introduced.
126
 Of these 1,887 petitions, the majority ad-
dressed the military (63.17%) and administration (non-military) (17.91%).
127
 
But the petitions also included commercial petitions (9.64%), and a handful of 
miscellaneous petitions (5.14%) on subjects ranging from abolition to admission 
of Vermont as a state to maritime issues.
128
 Before the establishment of standing 
committees, Congress referred a majority of these petitions—1,004 (53.22%)—
to the executive for review, investigation, and reporting. Congress directed ap-
proximately 97% of these executive referrals to the Secretary of Treasury or the 
Secretary of War. Congress referred the balance of these early petitions, or 647 
(34.29%), to select committees or one of the two early standing committees—
elections and claims. Congressional committees and the executive took the refer-
ral of a petition quite seriously. Once referred, the executive returned a report in 
 
123. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 4, 1789 TO 
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 5-6 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter COMM. ON ENERGY REPORT]. This 
1986 report undertaken by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce to study the or-
igins of the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures—the original predecessor of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, established on December 14, 1795—sheds light on how 
the House responded to the volume of early petitioning. The report expands on the work of 
the First Federal Congress Project to examine petitioning in the House for the first three Con-
gresses and a portion of the Fourth Congress. Id. 
124. These data are drawn from the Congressional Petitions Database, comparing the Senate data 
to the volume in the House. 
125. Id. 
126. COMM. ON ENERGY REPORT, supra note 123, at 362 tbl.II. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. As for the disposition of these diverse petitions, the vast majority received some substantive 
response. Congress “tabled” a minority of petitions (11.76%), a procedure used when Con-
gress determined that a petition addressed matters outside its jurisdiction or needed to post-
pone consideration. It rejected or gave leave to withdraw only a small sliver of petitions 
(0.74%), procedures used when petitions were procedurally inadequate, improperly filed, or 
believed to be fraudulent. Id. at 361 tbl.I. 
the yale law journal 127:1538  2018 
1570 
response to 71.61% of petitions referred and congressional committees reported 
at a rate of 60.90%. 
2. The Congressional Petitions Database 
Identifying trends in the over 500,000 petitions introduced to Congress dur-
ing the twenty Congresses convened between the Founding and 1980 presents a 
considerable challenge. The petition process underwent repeated changes as 
Congress redirected petitions on particular topics toward specialized commis-
sions and boards. The story of the petition process that follows focuses on 
changes in volume. A preliminary analysis of the House, the chamber that han-
dled the lion’s share of petitions, reveals a petition process that grew in volume 
and scope steadily over 150 years, and then essentially disappeared from Con-
gress in the late 1940s. Amidst a growing population, an increase in federal 
power, and a reduction in communication costs, the petition volume in Congress 
grew. However, rather than growing in leaps and bounds after the Civil War, 
volume adjusted for population stabilized. Then, in the late 1940s, the petition 
volume in Congress dropped to near-zero levels, where it has remained until 
modern day. The following Sections describe this growth and then offer an ex-
planation for the disappearance. 
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FIGURE 3. 
HOUSE PETITION VOLUME, FIRST THROUGH ONE-HUNDREDTH CONGRESSES 
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FIGURE 4. 
HOUSE PETITIONS PER 100,000 POPULATION, 1789-1980 
 
With respect to overall trends, the House saw an increase in volume from 
598 petition introductions at the Founding to 14,957 in the 62nd Congress (1911-
1913), which roughly tracked the growth of population in the United States from 
4 million at the Founding to approximately 92 million in 1910. Following the 
62nd Congress (1911-1913), however, petitioning in the House began a period of 
decline and never again saw the peaks in volume it experienced in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Major wars, including the Civil War (37th-
38th Congress, 1861-1865), World War I (63rd-65th
 
Congress, 1914-1918), and 
World War II (76th-78th Congress, 1939-1945), generally saw a decline in the 
volume of petition introductions as both Congress and the population turned 
their attention to more pressing matters.  
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FIGURE 5. 
MEAN PETITION INTRODUCTION BY PHASE PER 100,000 POPULATION 
 
With respect to specific trends, it is helpful to divide the petition volume in 
Congress into four distinct phases.
129
 The first phase (1789-1861) saw an overall 
increase in petition volume from the First Congress until the 62nd Congress, as 
the population of the United States grew and its jurisdiction expanded west. Fol-
lowing a lull in petition introductions during the Jeffersonian era and the War 
of 1812, the volume kept pace with, and often increased faster than the rate of 
population growth during this period. This phase also saw one of the highest 
peaks in petition volume. During the 25th Congress (1837-1839) abolitionists 
 
129. These four phases are a simplified version of the phases outlined in the Final Report of the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure that tracks the growth of “ABC” 
agencies over time. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 8, at 1-11 (1st Sess. 1941). There, the Committee described the 
“growth of the administrative agencies” in five phases: from “1789 to the close of the Civil 
War”; from “1865 to the turn of the century”; from “1900 to the end of the World War”; from 
“1918 to the beginning of the depression of 1929”; and from “1930 to 1940.” Id. To better see 
trends in the volume panel data that also tracked the growth of formal administrative agen-
cies, I adopted these phases in a consolidated form. Such consolidation better illustrated 
trends in the panel data without unnecessary duplication and allowed me to examine data past 
the 1941 publication date of the report. 
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submitted over 4,000 petitions in response to the Gag Rule, a resolution enacted 
by the House to table all petitions submitted on the subject of slavery, which had 
just gone into effect. Many legal historians have argued that the Gag Rule ended 
the petition process in Congress,
130
 but as the panel data show, petition volume 
in fact continued to grow for the next hundred years. 
The second phase (1862-1914) lasted from the Civil War until World War I. 
Per capita petition volume largely maintained the levels seen previously, but with 
slightly less variation. This phase saw a number of peaks in petition volume due 
to high-volume petition campaigns on particular issues of public concern. The 
Industrial Revolution and lowered communication costs likely contributed to a 
qualitative change in the petition process during this period, as campaigns were 
better coordinated and able to organize mass responses to fashionable issues of 
the day. For example, petition volume during the 52nd Congress (1891-1893), 
which saw an all-time high of 16,206 petition introductions, was largely driven 
by a petition campaign over whether the four-hundred-year celebration of the 
discovery of the Americas, the Columbus Exposition, would open its doors on a 
Sunday. 
The third phase (1915-1945) was a period of significant decline in per capita 
petition volume from the levels of the last two phases. This phase also saw the 
greatest level of growth in the administrative state as Congress created more than 
double the number of agencies seen before 1915. The four-year period from 1934 
to 1938 saw more than thirty-eight “alphabet agencies” created as part of the 
New Deal. As petitioners turned to specialized agencies and boards for relief, 
petitioning appears to have changed qualitatively in Congress as well. As with 
the second phase, volume during this period continued to be driven by high-
volume campaigns on matters of public concern. 
The fourth and final phase began in 1947, with the 80th Congress. This 
phase witnessed a precipitous decline in petitioning campaigns. It began with 
the implementation of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, which trans-
formed the committee system in Congress, banned the passage of private bills 
often used to resolve petitions, and transferred jurisdiction over the most com-
mon topics of petitions to the courts and the executive. Two hundred years after 
 
130. See, e.g., David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of 
Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1991); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right 
To Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 739, 751 (1999); Higginson, supra note 90, at 158-65. The vol-
ume of petitions on a range of matters from public to private continued to grow in the House 
following the Gag Rule. In fact, Congress witnessed steady petition campaigns on public mat-
ters into the twentieth century, when petitions on private matters declined in Congress and 
increased within the agencies and the courts. Recent scholarship in legal history and political 
science has begun to chip away at the widespread belief that the congressional petition process 
died out after the Gag Rule. Data from the Congressional Petitions Database should finally 
put this theory to rest. 
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the Founding, and with a population that now exceeded 131 million, the 100th 
Congress saw the introduction of only 241 petitions into the House, half the 
number introduced to the House during the Founding Congress. 
3. The Legislative Reorganization Act and the Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946 
Following a steady decline in petition volume after 1914, when specialized 
agencies and boards mushroomed during and after World War I, Congress fi-
nally dismantled the last vestiges of the congressional petition process with the 
passage of two statutes in the summer of 1946: the Legislative Reorganization 
Act
131
 and the Administrative Procedure Act.
132
 These Acts put an end to the 
congressional petition process. In particular, the LRA reduced the standing com-
mittees in Congress, which had been the loci of petition processing, and granted 
jurisdiction over these petitions to the executive and to the courts. The APA en-
sured procedural protections for petitioners in the agencies, while the LRA po-
sitioned Congress as the watchdog of those procedural protections. 
The APA is inarguably the most researched and litigated statute governing 
the administrative state. To date, however, the relationship between the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and the petition process has received little attention.
133
 
This omission is all the more surprising given the Act’s explicit tethering to the 
petition process. The APA directly extended the right of petition to the agencies, 
and it codified certain procedures that resembled the petition process in Con-
gress. In particular, the Act protected the right to petition directly in the context 
of rulemaking, requiring all agencies to “accord any interested person the right 
to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule,” and requiring agen-
cies to provide prompt notice for the denial of any petition.
134
 
There is evidence that the Petition Clause itself motivated inclusion of this 
provision. The legislative history prepared by the Senate cites the Petition Clause 
 
131. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
132. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
133. The rare administrative history that treats these two statutes together, authored by legal his-
torian Joanna Grisinger, has recognized that Congress envisioned the two statutes as comple-
mentary. GRISINGER, supra note 30, at 109-52. In particular, she recalls the Administrative 
Procedure Act as an effort to bring procedural due process into the administrative state and to 
foster oversight of that due process through judicial review. She describes the Legislative Re-
organization Act as the legislative counterpart to that judicial oversight and an effort to pro-
vide Congress with the infrastructure necessary to provide similar oversight. Id. No history to 
date, however, has discussed the connection between the two Acts and the petition process. 
134. Pub. L. No. 79-404, §§ 4, 6, 60 Stat. at 241. 
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explicitly as the basis for the provision.
135
 The Final Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Committee on Administration, heralded at the time as “undoubtedly the 
most thorough and comprehensive study ever made of Federal administrative 
procedure,”
136
 recommended inclusion of a formal petition process as part of an 
overall scheme to strengthen public participation within the rulemaking pro-
cess.
137
 
Notice and comment rulemaking itself embodies the petition right indirectly. 
The Final Report of the Attorney General found that much of the administrative 
state, rather than responding to individual petitions on rules, had begun to an-
nounce proposed regulations in advance and to hold public hearings before is-
suance. The APA did not invent new practices for administrative procedures out 
of whole cloth; rather, the Act aimed to reaffirm the best procedures already at 
work in some corners of the administrative state. At the recommendation of the 
Attorney General’s Report,
138
 the APA required that agencies provide notice to 
the public of a proposed rule and “give interested persons an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or argu-
ments,” either in a public hearing or otherwise.
139
 Thus, the Act codified proce-
dures that had originated in the petition process. 
While the APA transformed the administrative state, the comparatively un-
derstudied LRA transformed Congress. During the last throes of World War II, 
Congress created the first Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to 
draft a bill that would fundamentally restructure Congress and the lawmaking 
process.
140
 Formation of the Joint Committee was a response to concerns that 
the administrative state was handling the bulk of public affairs with little or no 
 
135. S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 21 (1946) (“One agency objects to the statutory statement of a right of 
petition on the ground that it would ‘force’ a ‘tremendous’ number of hearings. The alterna-
tive implied is that no one should have a right of petition, leaving action or inaction to the 
initiative of the agency concerned. Even Congress, under the Bill of Rights, is required to 
accord the right of petition to any citizen. If a petitioner states and supports a valid ground 
for hearing or relief, manifestly he should be entitled to hearing or relief. Not every petition 
need result in a hearing, just as not every complaint need result in trial.”). 
136. James Hart, Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 35 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 501, 501 (1941). 
137. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. 
NO. 8, at 1-202 (1st Sess. 1941). 
138. Id. at 105-08. 
139. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
140. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, S. REP. NO. 79-1011, 
at 1 (1946). 
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congressional oversight.
141
 After thorough investigation, the Joint Committee 
declared that “the real workshop” of Congress
142
—that is, the committees—had 
stalled due to a muddled and overly complex committee structure.
143
 
To afford members “time properly to weigh and consider legislative matters 
referred” to the committees, the report recommended reducing the standing 
committees in the Senate from thirty-three to sixteen and from forty-eight to 
eighteen in the House.
144
 It suggested limitations on how many committees each 
member could join. Finally, it supported an appropriation to expand legislative 
infrastructure, including a permanent staff to assist each committee, a legislative 
counsel’s office to assist in drafting, and a research service to provide unbiased 
research support.
145
 According to the report, the increased staff was necessary to 
prevent the practice of borrowing specialized executive staff—which had become 
increasingly prevalent within congressional committees—and to stem the tide of 
bills drafted by the executive—which the Joint Committee estimated at over half 
of all bills introduced to Congress.
146
 
The Joint Committee shaped the LRA to accomplish two primary ends. The 
first was to refocus congressional attention toward national matters.
147
 To ad-
dress this issue, the LRA banned the private bills that had long served as a means 
 
141. Id. (“Our committee was created in response to a widespread congressional and public belief 
that a grave constitutional crisis exists in which the fate of representative government itself is 
at stake. Public affairs are now handled by a host of administrative agencies headed by none-
lected officials with only casual oversight by Congress. The course of events has created a 
breach between government and the people . . . . Under these conditions, it was believed, the 
time is ripe for Congress to reconsider its role in the American scheme of government and to 
modernize its organization and procedures.”). 
142. Id. at 2 (“About 90 percent of all the work of the Congress on legislative matters is carried on 
in these committees. Most bills recommended by congressional committees become laws of 
the land and the content of legislation finally passed is largely determined in the commit-
tees.”). 
143. Standing committees mushroomed to a total of eighty-one: thirty-three in the Senate and 
forty-eight in the House with overlapping and unclear jurisdictions. Id. Committee surveys 
revealed that members were stretched thin between the work of these committees, as many 
members of the Senate served on upwards of seven to ten committees, and members of the 
House served on as many as six or more committees. Id. at 2-3. 
144. Id. at 3-4. 
145. Id. at 3-18. 
146. Id. at 11. 
147. 92 CONG. REC. 10048 (1946) (statement of Rep. Michener); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON THE 
ORG. OF CONG., LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1946, at 7 (Comm. Print 1974) (“Con-
gress is overburdened by many local and private matters which divert its attention from na-
tional policy making and which it ought not to have to consider. It functions as a common 
council for the District of Columbia. It serves as a tribunal for the settlement of private claims. 
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of resolving petitions for private claims, pension bills, bridge bills, and other lo-
cal and private legislation.
148
 Further, the law reduced the number of standing 
committees in Congress and transferred jurisdiction over those petitions to the 
executive or the courts. The Act also addressed the informal method of public 
engagement in the lawmaking process that had come to fill the void of the peti-
tion process in Congress: lobbying. In its draft bill, the Joint Committee in-
cluded the first proposed lobbying regulations at the federal level—the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act—that designed a registration and disclosure regime 
for professional federal lobbyists.
149
 
The second primary purpose of the LRA was to create infrastructure within 
Congress for oversight of the agencies, including the petition process that Con-
gress had transferred to the executive. To this end, the LRA matched the consol-
idated committee structure in Congress to the exact structure and jurisdiction of 
the administration.
150
 For example, the Committees on Pensions, Invalid Pen-
sions, and World War Veterans’ Legislation were consolidated into a Committee 
on Veterans’ Affairs, an analogue to the United States Department of Veterans 
Affairs.
151
 The LRA also expanded the committees’ enforcement power by in-
creasing investigative and subpoena capacity, and it recommended charging the 
restructured committees “to conduct a continuous review of the laws originally 
reported by the committees.”
152
 Finally, in the event that it was not wholly clear, 
the LRA included an explicit charge that the consolidated standing committees 
should provide ongoing oversight of the administration.
153
 
 
It spends much time on pension bills, the construction of bridges over navigable waters, and 
other private and local matters. . . . Congressmen are also handicapped by a host of routine 
chores for constituents which they are glad to perform, but which leave them little time for 
adequate study of national legislative problems.”).  
148. Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 812, 831 (1946). 
149. Id. at §§ 301-11, 60 Stat. at 814, 839. The bill also established self-government for the District 
of Columbia, provided each member with administrative support for constituent services, and 
established a private commission to resolve correction of military records, among other pro-
visions. Id. at § 207, 60 Stat. at 837 (military records). 
150. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE ORG. OF CONG., S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 6 (1946) 
(“The reconstructed standing committees will, it is hoped, roughly parallel the reorganized 
administrative structure of the executive branch of the Government and will be utilized as 
vehicles of consultation and collaboration between Congress and the corresponding adminis-
trative agencies within their respective jurisdictions.”); id. at §§ 102, 121, 60 Stat. at 814, 822. 
151. Id. 
152. S. REP. NO. 79-1011, supra note 140, at 6. 
153. Section 136 of the Act provided: “To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of 
the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall exercise con-
tinuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, 
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Together, the LRA and the APA redefined the petition process. They disman-
tled petition infrastructure in Congress, transferred jurisdiction over the remain-
ing petition volume to the executive and the courts, and restructured Congress 
to serve as overseer. However, these two statutes merely erased the last vestiges 
of a process that had largely relocated elsewhere. Petition volume had already 
been steadily declining since 1914, when Congress began in earnest to build the 
modern state and transfer jurisdiction over increasing numbers of petitions from 
congressional committees into various commissions, boards, and agencies. The 
following Section explores that evolution in greater depth. 
i i .  evolutions 
The narrative of petitioning in this Article draws its arc from the volume of 
congressional petitioning over time. In the first decade after the Founding, the 
petition volume in Congress grew as the population grew. However, at the end 
of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the petition vol-
ume stabilized and then began to decline. Finally, the volume of petitions in Con-
gress dropped dramatically in the late 1940s to levels lower than at the Founding, 
adjusted for population. One hypothesis to explain this reduction in volume is 
that Congress had steadily constructed separate boards, agencies, commissions, 
and courts to process these petitions and had siphoned off many petitions to 
Congress to these other fora. 
To better explore this hypothesis, as well as some of the other dynamics of 
the congressional petition process and its institutional development, we con-
structed a topic model in the Database to sort petitions into topics. Congress 
largely constructed alternative fora for petitions based on substantive expertise. 
By tracking petitions according to topic, the topic model documents the siphon-
ing of topics into these specialized fora. In particular, examining topics that had 
the highest volume of petitioning illustrates the larger siphoning-off process that 
rendered the congressional petition process largely vestigial by the late 1940s. To 
this end, I selected three of the highest volume topic areas of petitions—claims, 
pensions, and commerce—and crafted case studies specific to each. The case 
study of each high-volume topic area documents the siphoning of petition vol-
ume away from Congress and into the specialized boards, commission, agencies, 
and courts that now constitute the modern state. 
 
the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, 
shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the 
executive branch of Government.” Id. § 136, 60 Stat. at 832. 
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Each of the case studies shares a common narrative arc. The siphoning pro-
cess for claims, pensions, and commerce all originated within the committee sys-
tem in Congress. Congress often began by constructing infrastructure within 
Congress to resolve petitions. But it quickly turned to the courts and executive 
offices and agents to build out the infrastructure of the petition process. Finally, 
Congress turned to such innovative institutional forms as independent commis-
sions, boards, agencies, and specialized courts. 
Moreover, each of the case studies offers a view on the petition process and 
the development of the modern state. For example, both claims and pensions 
required additional infrastructure to resolve a growing workload. But pensions 
required the assistance of the executive, specifically the Department of War. 
Claims petitions were seen as more adjudicative, in that they required more due 
process and the proliferation of general principles to resolve uniformly. Congress 
therefore quickly transitioned from operating through an adjudicative board to 
creating a new form of court. Finally, commerce petitions presented a distinctive 
case; there, petitions drove the creation of regulatory programs. Through an it-
erative process, Congress built commercial infrastructure in response to peti-
tions and then responded to petitions in regulating how that commercial infra-
structure would be used. Congress constructed the commerce petition process 
to facilitate specialization and public engagement around the types of commer-
cial infrastructure and the markets that relied on that infrastructure. These three 
case studies also document some of the earliest standing committees—Claims, 
Pensions, and Commerce—established by Congress, and provide a view of the 
early institutional development of the Founding Era. 
Collectively, these case studies provide an extended longitudinal view of the 
petition process through dramatic shifts in parties, wars, technological revolu-
tion, and population growth from under 4 million to over 142 million. The Com-
mittee on Claims existed in various forms for over 150 years in the House until 
the LRA abolished it in 1946.
154
 The 133-year-old Committee on Pensions re-
mained in operation until the LRA fundamentally restructured it in 1946 and 
charged the renamed “Committee on Veterans’ Affairs” with mere oversight of 
pension processing elsewhere.
155
 And the Committee on Commerce survived the 
LRA largely unscathed and has remained in continuous operation in the House, 
under various names, for over 200 years.
156
 Together, these case studies docu-
ment the siphoning of petition volume from the congressional petition process 
 
154. GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE NATIONAL 
ARCHIVES, 1789-1989: BICENTENNIAL EDITION ch. 6 (Charles E. Schamel et al. eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE]. 
155. Id. ch. 20. 
156. Id. ch. 7. 
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and into the modern state—revealing the roots of the modern state in the peti-
tion process and the rise and fall of congressional petitioning. 
A. Siphoning Off Adjudication: The Court of Claims 
As the second oldest standing committee in the House, the Committee on 
Claims has witnessed the inner workings of Congress for over two hundred 
years. Over the course of those two hundred years, pressed by concerns about 
capacity and expertise, Congress built out the petition infrastructure for claims 
processing by creating independent commissions and specialized courts. Peti-
tions for claims spanned a broader range of grievances than our claims process 
encompasses today. Grievances included not only claims of government miscon-
duct but also refund requests; requests for waiver of rules of general applicabil-
ity; and relief for harm caused by natural disasters, wars, and other misfortunes. 
Michele Dauber reminds us that this expansive disaster relief system held the 
origins of our modern welfare state.
157
 The claims petition system began with 
the resolution of individual petitions through private bills, but Congress quickly 
turned to the use of general legislation to resolve petitions for classes of claim-
ants.
158
 Dauber notes that “[b]y 1827 Congress had already granted more than 
two dozen claims for relief, encompassing thousands of claimants and millions 
of dollars, following events such as the Whiskey Rebellion; the slave insurrec-
tion in St. Domingo (Haiti); and various fires, floods, and storms.”
159
 
Despite the use of general legislation to resolve petitions en masse, the ex-
pansive claims system soon began to strain under the volume of claims petitions. 
In the First Congress, the House of Representatives adopted its petition proce-
dures for settling claims against the federal government from the Confederation 
Congress, but the volume of claims following the Revolutionary War exceeded 
the capabilities of the newly formed institution.
160
 To address this growing vol-
ume, in 1794 the House established a mixed legislative and executive claims pe-
tition process, including the Committee on Claims and a process within the 
 
157. DAUBER, supra note 20, at 17-34. 
158. Id. at 18. 
159. Id. at 5. 
160. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, paras. 6.15-6.32; 7 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 MARCH 1789-3 MARCH 1791, 
at xvii-xviii (Kenneth R. Bowling et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 
7]; DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xi. 
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Treasury Department that resembled the Confederation Congress’s three-mem-
ber commission termed the “Board of Treasury.”
161
 Unlike the Confederation 
Congress, however, the United States Congress began to direct all claims to the 
Comptroller of the newly formed Treasury, which then issued a decision.
162
 If 
the claimant was satisfied with the Comptroller’s decision, it became final.
163
 
Congress maintained some control over the process through its appropriations 
power—it could always decline to grant an appropriation for the award.
164
 Con-
gress also provided the means of appeal; dissatisfied claimants could challenge 
the Comptroller’s decision with a petition to Congress, which was most often 
resolved by the Committee on Claims.
165
 
The antebellum era saw a preservation and expansion of the mixed legislative 
and executive claims process, and the Congressional Petitions Database reveals a 
steady increase in claims petition introductions of over 700% from the Founding 
until 1835. With this increase in volume came delays in consideration as well as 
complete failures to respond. Only 40% of the claims petitions introduced to the 
22nd through 24th Congresses (1831-1837) received any kind of process.
166
 Alt-
hough the mixed legislative-executive claims petition process had not raised con-
stitutional concern, violations of the petition right caused by undue delays were 
seen as serious. Congress faced growing criticism over its mishandling of claims 
petitions. 
After leaving the presidency, John Quincy Adams became a House Repre-
sentative and fierce advocate on behalf of the right to petition.
167
 Adams began 
to call for a court of claims as early as 1832.
168
 To Adams, protection of the right 
to petition was paramount—even above and beyond preserving Congress’s tra-
ditional role as the primary institution for claims petitions. Even if processing 
 
161. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a 
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 634, 643-44 (1985). 
162. Id. at 637-45. 
163. Id. at 644-45. 
164. Id. at 637; see also id. at 644 (“[D]uring this period two general but separate claims systems 
were functioning—the congressional committee system and the Treasury Department sys-
tem.”). 
165. Id. at 637, 644-45. 
166. William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 392 
(1968). 
167. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE GREAT BAT-
TLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 443-44 (1998) (defending the right to petition against 
the “gag rules”). 
168. Wiecek, supra note 166, at 392. 
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claims petitions was traditionally legislative, Adams argued that claims petitions 
required courts to secure due process. 
There ought to be no private business before Congress. There is a great 
defect in our institutions by the want of a Court of Exchequer or Cham-
ber of Accounts. It is a judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought 
to have nothing to do with it. One-half of the time of Congress is con-
sumed by it, and there is no common rule of justice for any two of the 
cases decided. A deliberative Assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the 
administration of justice.
169
   
The House Committee of Claims, charged in 1832 with examining the efficiency 
of its claims process, shared Adams’s concerns that legislative resolution of 
claims was simply not administrable and required a more streamlined process, 
such as a commission empowered to issue judgments. As the committee stated 
in its report: 
Whoever has attended to the proceedings on private claims in our House, 
must be sensible of the impracticability of doing justice in more than two 
hundred cases by this course. Years will sometimes elapse before a claim-
ant can obtain even the form of a discussion of his case in the House; and 
then it may be under such circumstances of apathy and inattention, as 
shall render the chance of obtaining justice very uncertain at best. A dis-
tinguished member has observed that the right of petitioning Congress 
virtually had become the right of having petitions rejected.
170
 
By 1848, over a decade later, faith in the claims processing system in Congress 
had only declined. The House Committee on Claims described its own claims 
process as “a system of unparalleled injustice, and wholly discreditable to any 
civilized nation.”
171
 Congressmen began to call for a solution that would “relieve 
the Speaker’s table from that accumulated and accumulating mass of private 
business under which it has literally groaned for five-and-twenty years.”
172
 
 
169. 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, 
at 480 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876). 
170. H.R. REP. NO. 22-386, at 19 (1831). 
171. H.R. REP. NO. 30-498, at 2 (1948); see also WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART II: ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855-1978, at 9 (1978); 
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 395. 
172. Wiecek, supra note 166, at 395 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1852)). 
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The solution came in 1855 in the form of the Court of Claims Act.
173
 The Act 
had originated in the Senate as a bill to establish a general commission “for the 
examination and adjustment of private claims.”
174
 Earlier claims commissions 
had been given narrow jurisdiction over claims specific to a particular event, 
most often war, and the predecessor of the Court of Claims Act aimed to repur-
pose an old solution for a new problem. An overworked Congress mustered 
enough opposition to amend the three-member commission into a three-judge 
court with jurisdiction over “all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or 
upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express 
or implied, with the government of the United States.”
175
 
The Act raised concerns over both feasibility and constitutionality.
176
 Both 
chambers questioned particulars of the proposed solution—that is, would the 
court be empowered to issue final judgments and would Congress still be re-
quired to pass an appropriation to fund those judgments—and whether those 
particulars accorded with the Constitution.
177
 As is often the case with contro-
versial legislative proposals, Congress resolved the debate with ambiguity and 
delay.
178
 The 1855 Court of Claims Act passed both houses without clear text de-
termining whether the court would resolve claims with finality.
179
 
Early efforts by the House to disallow final judgments from the “experi-
mental” Court of Claims by reviewing them in select committees, rather than 
with a pro forma stamp of approval from the whole House, stymied the court.
180
 
Members began to refer to the Court of Claims as an “excres[c]ence on the Gov-
ernment,” calling its judgments “a mere mockery on justice.”
181
 Abraham Lincoln 
called for quick reform in his first State of the Union in 1861.
182
 
 
173. Id. (quoting Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612 (1855)). 
174. CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 70 (1855). 
175. Ernst Freund, Private Claims Against the State, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 625, 632 (1893). 
176. Wiecek, supra note 166, at 396-97. 
177. Id. at 396. 
178. Id. at 397. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.; Shimomura, supra note 161, at 652-53. 
181. Wiecek, supra note 166, at 398. 
182. Id. (quoting 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3252 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897-
1911) (“It is important that some more convenient means should be provided, if possible, for 
the adjustment of claims against the government, especially in view of their increased number 
by reason of the war . . . . The investigation and adjudication of claims in their nature belong 
to the judicial department; besides, it is apparent that the attention of Congress will be more 
than usually engaged, for some time to come, with great national questions. It was intended, 
by the organization of the Court of Claims, mainly to remove this branch of business from 
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Congress attempted to respond to Lincoln’s call for reform, but it stalled over 
whether the new bill should maintain the Court of Claims or refer claims to the 
federal district courts, and whether the bill should waive sovereign immunity 
explicitly.
183
 A conflicted Congress stalled reform for over two years until a flood 
of Civil War claims propelled the 1863 Court of Claims Act through both cham-
bers and onto Lincoln’s desk.
184
 The flood of Civil War claims did not, however, 
wash away all of the constitutional concerns with the court.
185
 The Act purported 
to provide for finality of the court’s judgments and appeal of the judgments to 
the Supreme Court.
186
 But, at the same time, it preserved and reaffirmed a prac-
tice whereby the Secretary of the Treasury had to “estimate[] for” each claim 
before it was paid and Congress had to appropriate the funds for each judg-
ment.
187
 Constitutional concerns faded as the Court of Claims established itself 
as an efficient means to process petitions for claims, and as Congress steadily 
siphoned more claims petitions to the courts. 
Over the eighty years that followed, Congress transferred the legislative-ex-
ecutive claims system into the courts through a progression similar to that of the 
Court of Claims. Congress first transferred expanded advisory jurisdiction over 
portions of the petition process and requested reports in return, rather than final 
judgments.
188
 Expanded advisory jurisdiction eventually ripened into full juris-
diction, as Congress transferred full consideration of claims, either generally or 
 
the halls of Congress; but while the court has proved to be an effective and valuable means of 
investigation, it in great degree fails to effect the object of its creation for want of power to 
make its judgments final.”); see also COWEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 21 (quoting Lincoln and 
describing Congress’s reaction); Shimomura, supra note 161, at 655 (quoting Lincoln); 
Wiecek, supra note 166, at 398-99 (quoting Lincoln and describing Congress’s attempt to fol-
low his instructions). 
183. Wiecek, supra note 166, at 399. 
184. Id. 
185. Shimomura, supra note 161, at 657-58. 
186. Id. at 657. 
187. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 426 (1863)); see also Wiecek, supra note 166, 
at 400 (describing the last-minute amendment requiring the Secretary to “estimate[]” 
claims). Congress repealed this requirement in 1866 after Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 
Wall.) 561 (1864), called the Court of Claim’s status as an Article III court into question, in 
part, because of the lack of finality of the Court’s judgments due to the provision. Wiecek, 
supra note 166, at 401-02. 
188. Shimomura, supra note 161, at 663-66. In 1883, Congress reached out to the courts for assis-
tance with a growing claims petition docket with an “act to afford assistance and relief to 
Congress and the executive departments in the investigation of claims and demands against 
the government.” Bowman Act, ch. 116, 22 Stat. 485 (1883). The Bowman Act provided that 
all claims petitions pending before any Senate or House committee or before the executive 
the yale law journal 127:1538  2018 
1586 
for specific classes of petitions. What had once been the work of Congress and 
an independent commission had now become the work of the courts.
189
 
The final large transfer of claims petitions came in 1946 with the passage of 
the LRA and, in particular, Title IV of the Act, separately titled the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA abolished the claims committees in Congress, 
banned the issuance of private bills for covered claims, and delegated jurisdiction 
over all claims petitions to the Court of Claims and the federal courts.
190
 Follow-
ing this transfer, the number of claims petitions in Congress decreased to the low 
volume of petitions seen today, dramatically lower even than the claims petition 
volume at the Founding. 
B. Siphoning Off the Provision of Public Benefits: The Bureau of Pensions 
The American pension system began with the Revolution, and it began with 
petitions. Over the next 150 years, the pension petition system followed a similar 
pattern to that of claims. It originated within the committee system in Congress 
and then, in response to workload and expertise concerns, Congress began to 
build out the pension petition process using the infrastructure of the federal 
courts, independent commissions, and the executive. 
The Continental Congress, faced with mounting petitions for relief in the 
spring of 1776, passed the nascent government’s first general pension legislation 
offering “invalid pensions”—pensions to soldiers whose injuries during Revolu-
tionary War service left them unable to earn a livelihood.
191
 These pensions were 
first paid for and administered by the separate states, which would report annu-
ally a roll of all pensioners to the Secretary of War.
192
 
In 1789, the First Congress took responsibility for payments to all pensioners 
listed on the state pension rolls with the intention of limiting pensions to only 
 
requiring investigation or fact finding would be transferred to the Court of Claims for inves-
tigation and reporting. The court then issued a report back to Congress or the executive for 
final judgment. Id. at 485-86. 
189. One of the most notable transfers came in 1887 in the form of the Tucker Act. Tucker Act, ch. 
359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)). To relieve Congress 
of some of its growing claims petition volume, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Claims to encompass claims for violation of the Constitution, claims grounded in 
government contracts, and claims for damages. The Tucker Act also leveraged the resources 
of the growing federal judiciary by creating limited concurrent jurisdiction over these same 
claims in the lower federal courts. Id. 
190. Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946). 
191. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 7, supra note 160, at 332. 
192. Id. 
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those listed.
193
 But, in response to a number of petitions, the First Congress 
quickly began to make exceptions.
194
 Upon receipt of these petitions, Congress 
would refer them primarily to the Secretary of War for a report.
195
 Following 
review of the Secretary’s report on a particular petition, Congress would draft 
and pass a private bill to resolve the petitioner’s grievance.
196
 Any petition re-
quiring the attention of Congress would be referred to the Committee on 
Claims, which held jurisdiction over pension petitions until the creation of a sep-
arate standing pensions committee in 1813.
197
 Despite these exceptions, the class 
of pensioners by early 1792 did not exceed 1,500 individuals.
198
 
Faced with a steady stream of petitions for exceptions, the Second Congress 
attempted to streamline the process and to draw on the resources of the judiciary 
and the executive.
199
 The 1792 Pension Act invited new pension petitions by re-
pealing the 1788 statute of limitations restricting the pension rolls, and estab-
lishing a hybrid judicial-executive process to resolve those new petitions.
200
 Ac-
cording to the 1792 Act, petitioners would submit their petitions not to 
Congress, but to the federal district courts. These courts would conduct the 
medical examination, review the petition, certify any requisite affidavits, and rec-
ommend a pension amount. The Act then directed the district courts to submit 
the examination, certified documents, and recommendation to the Secretary of 
War, who would ultimately decide whether to grant the petitioner a pension. 
Some members of the federal courts rebelled against the 1792 Act.
201
 Five of 
the then six sitting justices of the Supreme Court, who also served on the lower 
courts pursuant to the 1789 Judiciary Act, sent letters to President George Wash-
ington, declining their new appointments as “commissioners” under the 1792 
Act.
202
 United States Attorney General Edmond Randolph quickly petitioned for 
a writ of mandamus on behalf of pension petitioner William Hayburn to force 
 
193. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95. 
194. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 7, 1789 TO 
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 5 (Comm. Print 1986). 
195. Id. at 5-9, 11. 
196. Id. at 5-9. 
197. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, ch. 6. 
198. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 7, supra note 160, at 334. 
199. Id. 
200. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). 
201. Id. at 408. 
202. Id. at 408 n.*. 
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the courts to comply with the Act.
203
 Hayburn’s writ never resulted in a decision 
on the merits, as the Supreme Court continued the case to buy time and put 
pressure on Congress to amend the Act.
204
 The Court, in its order continuing 
the case, foreshadowed its constitutional concerns.
205
 In particular, the Court ex-
pressed deep concerns over the separation of powers issues raised by granting 
the Secretary of War the ability to override the district court’s recommendation 
to issue a pension.
206
 “Such revision and control,” the Court noted, was “radically 
inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is vested in the 
courts; and, consequently, with that important principle which is so strictly ob-
served by the constitution of the United States.”
207
 Moreover, it was clear, the 
Court noted, that Congress could also easily override any decision by either the 
Secretary or the courts, and that the Secretary did not hold the life tenure of a 
judge and was therefore subject to the caprice of Congress in his decision mak-
ing.
208
 
Legal scholars have deemed Hayburn’s Case an important early expression of 
the Supreme Court’s position on separation of powers, justiciability, and even 
judicial review of legislative action.
209
 But it remains equally important for its 
acceptance of the assignment of the petition process to the courts. In the remon-
strances submitted to the Congress by the circuit courts, appended to the or-
der,
210
 the courts did not question the 1792 Act’s requirement that the district 
courts assist in investigation and fact-finding. The remonstrances also did not 
raise concerns regarding the Secretary of War’s role—even though the pension 
process previously had been well accepted as within the province of the legisla-
ture. The fact that the courts continued to assist Congress with the petition pro-
cess affirmed that omission of these concerns was likely intentional. 
 
203. Id. at 408. 
204. Id. at 408-10; see also William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 455, 536 (2005) (“[T]he Court decided to delay to see if Congress would respond to the 
constitutional concerns that had been raised and repeal the Invalid Pensions Act.”). 
205. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 408 n.*. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 
81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 438-41 (1996). 
210. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 408 n.*; 6 The DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, CASES: 1790-1795, at 33 n.4 (Maeva Marcus et al. 
eds., 1998). 
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Before the Supreme Court could act on Hayburn’s Case, Congress acquiesced 
and passed an amendment to the Act in 1793.
211
 Pursuant to the amendment, the 
district courts would continue to examine petitions and certify affidavits and 
documentation, but would no longer make a recommendation on whether to 
grant the pension. To avoid lodging all discretion with the Secretary of War, the 
amendment required the Secretary of War to report all pensions granted to the 
Committee on Claims for final consideration.
212
 
The standing Committee on Claims continued to handle final approvals on 
pension petitions for the next fifty years. But in 1813, a Congress overwhelmed 
by the War of 1812 created the first standing Committee on Pensions and Revo-
lutionary War Claims. However, the flood of pension petitions only grew in the 
antebellum era. The number of pensioners in 1816 was 2,200, only a few hundred 
more than the 1,500 pensioners on rolls during the First Congress. But just four 
years later, that figure had risen to 17,730. That increase was no doubt due, in 
part, to Congress’s expansion of military pensions in 1818 to all Revolutionary 
War veterans living in poverty, regardless of disability. Advocates of the 1818 
Pension Act anticipated 2,000 new pension petitions. Instead, following passage 
of the Act, the Pension Bureau was overwhelmed with 20,000 petitions for new 
pensions. Pension petitions to the Committee on Pensions and Revolutionary 
War Claims increased by nine times between the 15th and 19th Congresses
213
 
until yet another war tested the capacity of the Committee.
214
 
 
211. Invalid Pensions Act of 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324; see also Maeva Marcus, Is the Supreme Court a 
Political Institution?, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 95, 104 & n.38 (2003) (describing the political 
context of the continuance and subsequent mooting of Hayburn’s Case). 
212. See Invalid Pensions Act §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 324-25. What Congress considered final considera-
tion shifted over the years as Congress asserted more or less control over the process. To illus-
trate Congress’s mercurial approach to oversight: For about seven years, from 1796 until 1803, 
Congress began to pass private bills to grant new petitions for new pensions. See WILLIAM H. 
GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 61-62 (1918). Then in 1803, 
Congress authorized the Secretary of War to add petitioners to the pension rolls in the absence 
of a private bill. Id. at 62. This phase lasted for another few years, until Congress reclaimed 
the pension process for itself and again began to pass private bills to resolve petitioners’ pen-
sion grievances. Id. at 63. 
213. The figures here are drawn from the Congressional Petitions Database. 
214. Over time, Congress would attempt to handle the increase in petition workload by creating 
more and more specialized committees to resolve petitions for particular pensions. In 1825, 
handling both pension petitions and revolutionary claims petitions became unmanageable 
and Congress split the pension committee in two. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, 
para. 6.34. The Committee on Revolutionary Claims continued to receive and process peti-
tions for claims. Id. para. 6.73. But the Committee on Military Pensions became the sole com-
mittee for pension petitions until Congress split the committee again a few years later. Id. 
para. 6.40. Congress’s liberalization of pensions would only continue, as Congress expanded 
pension eligibility for veterans of all wars—including the Indian Wars, the Mexican-American 
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As Theda Skocpol has rigorously documented, the Civil War took hold of 
the antebellum era pension system and shook it to its core.
215
 In 1862, before the 
enrollment of Civil War pensioners, the pension rolls totaled 10,700 pensioners 
at an expenditure of approximately $1 million per year.
216
 A mere four years later, 
in 1866, the pension rolls had grown to over 126,722 pensioners at an expendi-
ture of approximately $15.5 million per year.
217
 The Pension Bureau of the ante-
bellum era employed 72 staff members, but that number had multiplied to 1,500 
members by the mid-1880s.
218
 By 1891 the Pension Bureau, now a part of the 
Department of the Interior, employed over 2,000 staff members with a support 
staff of 419.
219
 But the sheer volume of pension petitions submitted to the Pen-
sion Bureau began to overwhelm even the infrastructure of what some consid-
ered “the largest executive bureau in the world.”
220
 The backlog measured several 
hundred thousand claims and stalled the pension system into the 1890s.
221
 
As was the case in the early nineteenth century, the congressional petition 
process served as a pressure valve for the Pension Bureau and allowed aggrieved 
individuals to petition Congress for redress. However, unlike the Pension Bu-
reau, which had expanded its staff and resources, Congress remained essentially 
the same institution, dependent upon its members without much staff support. 
Representative Robert M. La Follette, father of Robert M. La Follette Jr., who 
was one of the architects of the LRA, recalled that he spent 25-33% of his time in 
the House addressing pension petitions.
222
 La Follette was not the only member 
 
War, and others—in 1832, and to their widows in 1836. Theda Skocpol, America’s First Social 
Security System: The Expansion of Benefits for Civil War Veterans, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 92 (1993); 
see also Kristin A. Collins, “Petitions Without Number”: Widows’ Petitions and the Early Nine-
teenth-Century Origins of Marriage-Based Entitlements, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 8 (2013). To distrib-
ute workload over the new pensioners, Congress again split the Committee on Military Pen-
sions in two during the 22nd Congress (1831-1833). HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, 
para. 6.40. The Committee on Revolutionary Pensions would serve as a generalist committee 
for pensions granted based on service or need, while the Committee on Invalid Pensions 
would focus on disability pensions. Id. paras. 6.46, 6.59. 
215. SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 102-51. 
216. Id. at 107-08. 
217. Id. at 108. 
218. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 263. 
219. THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 60 (1995). 
220. Id. (quoting Green B. Raum, Pensions and Patriotism, 153 NORTH AM. REV. 205, 211 (1891)); 
accord SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 121. 
221. SKOCPOL, supra note 18, at 121. 
222. Id.  
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to expend a considerable amount of energy on pension petitions.
223
 Despite the 
best efforts of these members, the process afforded to petitions in Congress nec-
essarily became increasingly informal. 
Pension petitioners began to raise their grievances through letters to their 
representatives, rather than submitting formal complaint-like petitions. Interac-
tions between Congress and the Pension Bureau, although voluminous, were not 
conducted according to any formalized process at that time.
224
 During the period 
that La Follette was in office, the 
volume of correspondence between the Pension Bureau and members of 
Congress was immense. In 1880 it was reported as amounting to nearly 
40,000 written and personal inquiries; in 1888 it had more than doubled 
(94,000 items); and by 1891 it reached a peak of 154,817 congressional 
calls for information on cases, an average of over 500 for each working 
day.
225
  
Even after shifting much of the pension process to the Pension Bureau, members 
of Congress still retained the ability to circumvent the agency entirely and resolve 
pensioners’ petitions with the passage of private bills. Through private bills, 
Congress could add pensioners directly to the rolls, increase the rate of a peti-
tioner’s pension, or correct a soldier’s military record to remove barriers to pen-
sion qualification, such as a desertion or dishonorable discharge.
226
 But private 
pension bills began to skyrocket under the informal petition “appeals” process of 
the late nineteenth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223. Id. (discussing Representative Roswell G. Horr). 
224. Id. at 122. 
225. Id. (quoting LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HIS-
TORY: 1869-1901, at 75 (1958)). 
226. Id. at 122-23. 
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FIGURE 6. 
PRIVATE BILLS BY CONGRESS 
 
 
Passage of private pension bills peaked in Congress during the 1880s and 
again in the 59th Congress (1909-1911) with a record high of 9,649. “In the 49th 
Congress [1885–1887], 40 percent of the legislation in the House and 55 percent 
in the Senate consisted of special pension acts. It was customary for Friday even-
ing to be ‘pension night’ during congressional sessions.”
227
 
Earlier Congresses referred pension petitions to the Pension Committees of 
each chamber and required a comprehensive reporting and review process. But 
the Pension Committees of the late nineteenth century, overwhelmed by the vol-
ume of pension petitions, relaxed the formal petition process even further.
228
 
The Pension Committees began dividing the pension petitions equally among 
all of the membership of each chamber for review.
229
 The sheer volume of peti-
tions often precluded review in any real depth, however, and many members 
simply handed their allocation over to their secretaries and congressional 
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clerks.
230
 Congress would then pass private pension bills with little to no formal 
process.
231
 
A review of the Congressional Petitions Database reveals a fairly steady de-
cline in pension petitions introduced into Congress in the twentieth century. 
This reduction, however, witnessed little corresponding decrease in the number 
of pensions actually processed.
232
 Years of frantic attempts to increase efficiency 
had finally transformed the petition process completely, taking with it many of 
the formalities and procedural protections afforded to each claimant. Descrip-
tions of the petition process during the 1920s capture a fully routinized system 
of pension processing wholly distinct from the petition process that preceded it. 
Petitions were no longer read on the floor, made part of the formal record, and 
processed individually.
233
 Rather, the first day of the 70th Congress (1927-1929) 
“broke an all time record for the number of bills referred to a committee in a 
single day” when 3,775 draft private bills were introduced to the House Commit-
tee on Pensions.
234
 The Committee then bundled these private bills into a single 
omnibus bill which again broke records as “the largest bill ever printed during 
any Congress.”
235
 It was this routinized system at which the LRA took aim. The 
Act explicitly banned the private bills used to resolve pensions, transferred juris-
diction over those pensions firmly to the Veterans Administration, and abolished 
the Committee on Pensions.
236
 The Act had its intended effect—the number of 
private pension bills slowed to the low volumes that we see today. 
The staggering rise and gradual decline of the petition process for pensions 
reveals several dynamics important for understanding the development of the 
modern administrative state. Ultimately, it shows how a process that allowed for 
formal interaction with Congress did not break down for fear of comingling of 
legislative and adjudicatory powers; nor did the process break down over con-
cerns that Congress created an innovative agency, board, or commission. In-
stead, the petition process broke down with respect to pensions because Con-
gress refused to construct an agency, board, or commission with full jurisdiction 
to process petitions. As the workload of Congress increased with a growth in 
 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. para. 6.56. 
235. Id. 
236. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 812, 831 (banning 
private bills); id. § 121(a), 60 Stat. at 829 (establishing the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs); 
see also HOUSE RECORDS GUIDE, supra note 154, para. 6.65. 
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population and a series of wars, Congress nevertheless attempted to retain pen-
sion petition processing internally. Until it was abolished, the petition process 
for pensions was replete with interactions between constituents and Congress 
that did not involve the vote or the initiative process. 
C. Siphoning Off Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Commission 
Like claims and pensions, commerce petitions also originated from the com-
mittee system in Congress. Congress transferred the commerce petition process 
into commissions, boards, and agencies that could develop specialized expertise. 
But commerce petitions differed in many ways from those making claims seek-
ing pensions. The volume of petitions did not drive the creation of further peti-
tion infrastructure; rather, the petitions’ substance led to the construction of com-
mercial infrastructure and mediated the use of that infrastructure. Petitions 
served as a mechanism by which the public could shape the development of the 
economy and have voice as to how Congress would regulate that economy. 
The House established the standing Committee on Commerce and Manu-
factures in the first session of the Fourth Congress (1795-1797) in order to “take 
into consideration all such petitions and matters or things touching the com-
merce [and manufactures] of the United States . . . .”
237
 Petitions later referred 
to the newly established Committee on Commerce had earlier been resolved with 
a referral to the Secretary of Treasury or to a select committee in the House.
238
 A 
review of the Database—specifically, petition introductions during the antebel-
lum era that were referred to the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures—
reveals petitions addressing a range of topics. However, petitions mostly focused 
on the regulation of commerce directly through the imposition of duties, tariffs, 
excises, embargoes, and indirectly by subsidizing and building the infrastructure 
of waterborne commerce. 
Commerce petitions provide examples of the complex ends to which peti-
tioners exercised the process—both to promote general legislation regulating 
commerce and then to request specific exceptions and amendments to that gen-
 
237. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WITH THE AMENDMENTS THERETO: TO 
WHICH ARE ADDED JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, THE STANDING RULES 
AND ORDERS FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, AND BARCLAY’S DIGEST 183 (1871) (documenting the relevant rule of the 
House adopted on Dec. 14, 1795). 
238. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, AND 
OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 7, 1789 TO 
DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 6 (Comm. Print 1986). 
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eral legislation. Early petitioners to the House, usually in the form of trade asso-
ciations organized by city, petitioned for the passage of general legislation pro-
moting American manufacture and trade through the imposition of duties and 
tariffs on imports.
239
 Congress responded with the passage of general duty and 
tariff legislation, known as the Impost Act, which went into effect in August 
1789.
240
 As early as December of that year, Congress began to receive petitions 
requesting exemptions from and amendments to the general revenue legislation. 
President Ezra Stiles of Yale College submitted the first petition for an exemp-
tion, praying for a refund of import duties paid on a “philosophical Apparatus”—
in modern parlance, basic lab equipment like air pumps and microscopes—re-
cently purchased from London for use at the college.
241
 Alexander Hamilton, 
then Secretary of Treasury, issued a report on Stiles’s petition, finding that an-
other recent act had exempted philosophical apparatus from import duties in the 
future. On those grounds, he recommended an equitable restitution of Stiles’s 
duties paid.
242
 Congress created a specific exemption for Yale College
243
 and, as 
was often the case, deferred to the report’s recommendation to continue the ex-
emption in future iterations of the statute.
244  
Beyond legislation regulating commerce through tariffs and the like, Con-
gress’s early regulation of commerce involved a complex relationship between 
subsidy of commercial infrastructure and licensing to regulate the use of that 
infrastructure. Petitions drove the subsidy process by identifying areas for de-
velopment, and commercial agents then had to petition for licenses to take ad-
vantage of the subsidy. A review of petition introductions in the Congressional 
Petitions Database reveals that, during the antebellum era, Congress primarily 
subsidized infrastructure for waterborne trade. These petitions provided the pri-
mary mechanism by which Congress identified the need for improvements, as 
cities, localities, and occasionally associations of individuals and merchants peti-
tioned Congress for improvements in their areas. Petitions included requests for 
 
239. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at 360-62. 
240. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24; see DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at 362-
63. Also in 1789, the same year that Congress passed general tariff legislation, Congress insti-
tuted a licensing scheme “for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regulating the Coasting 
Trade, and for other purposes.” 1 Stat. 55 (1789). The scheme’s primary aim was to facilitate 
the collection of duties and tariffs by requiring licensed ships to petition duty collectors for a 
license at each port and by requiring disclosure of all cargo subject to duties and delivery of 
the ship to collectors for inspection. Id. 
241. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at 363-64. 
242. Id. at 364. 
243. Id. at 362-63 (“[T]he Ways and Means Act [HR-83] had specifically exempted from duties 
‘Philosophical apparatus specially imported for any seminary of learning.’”). 
244. Id.  
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construction of navigation aids, like lighthouses, fog signals, and beacons; the 
designation of ports of entry to administer duties and tariffs; and improvement 
of the nation’s waterways with channels, bridges, and ports. 
In the first thirty years of the Republic, Congress focused its subsidies on 
coastal commerce, but before long the allure of steam power drew those subsi-
dies inland. A review of petitions from the 1820s in the Congressional Petitions 
Database reveals petitions for coastal lighthouses and ports that began to com-
mingle with petitions for inland waterway improvements for steamboats. Such 
petitions included requests to improve the navigability of Lake Erie, as well as 
the Connecticut, Hudson, and Ohio Rivers, among others. Given the ability of 
steamboats to traverse inland waterways at never-before-seen speeds, petitions 
also prayed for lakeside harbors, river lighthouses and bells, and the construction 
of canals to connect lakes and rivers. Not surprisingly, a review of the Congres-
sional Petitions Database reveals that many of these petitions derived from coa-
litions of steamboat owners and merchants, while residents of cities and states 
submitted the rest. 
Congress then began to regulate who could use its subsidized commercial 
infrastructure by requiring petitions for licenses.
245
 In effect, the subsidized in-
frastructure served as a vehicle for Congress to regulate areas of commerce pre-
viously entirely under the province of the states.
246
 For example, in response to 
petitions, the federal government began to open domestic waterways like the 
Hudson River to steamboat commerce, and then Congress required steamboat 
operators to petition for a license to use those domestic waterways.
247
 
As ships carrying federal licenses made their way into the interior of the 
United States, jurisdictional disputes arose between federal and state licensing 
schemes. These disputes evolved into the foundational efforts to clarify congres-
sional jurisdiction over the regulation of commerce. Former steamboat partners, 
Aaron Ogden and Thomas Gibbons, found themselves engaged in such a dispute 
following the bitter dissolution of their partnership in 1818.
248
 After their part-
nership dissolved, Ogden sued Gibbons in New York court to enforce his rights 
under the New York license they had previously shared. Gibbons countered that 
he had been granted a federal license to operate a ship, under a later version of 
the 1789 federal licensing scheme, which preempted Ogden’s monopoly.
249
 The 
 
245. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy,” supra note 24, at 1631. 
246. Id. at 1629. 
247. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
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New York Court of Errors sided with Ogden, and Gibbons appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.
250
 
In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall authored the Court’s opinion in Gibbons 
v. Ogden, reversing the Court of Errors and clarifying that Congress’s past regu-
lation of navigation—through licensing and infrastructure subsidy—fell within 
the scope of the term “commerce” in the Commerce Clause.
251
 To the question 
of whether the enumerated power to regulate “commerce” should encompass 
regulation of navigation, the Court looked to past practice.
252
 The power to reg-
ulate navigation, as an aspect of commerce, had been “exercised from the com-
mencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and 
has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation.”
253
 Because Congress 
had the power to regulate navigation and because the 1793 licensing scheme was 
a proper exercise of this power, the Supreme Court held that the state license 
must give way under the preemptive power of the Supremacy Clause.
254
 
Congress soon began to require petitions for licenses not only to regulate 
who could use its subsidized infrastructure but also to regulate how this infra-
structure would be used. In response to an increasing number of petitions pray-
ing for resolution of safety concerns around subsidized infrastructure, Congress 
aimed its licensing requirements at safety concerns. To use steamboats again as 
an illustration, despite Congress’s best efforts at ensuring the safety of the new 
steam powered waterways, this new form of transportation still presented a sig-
nificant hazard. Many quite gruesome boiler explosions aboard steamships, 
some carrying hundreds of passengers, raised public concern over steamboat 
safety.
255
 Petitions began to pray in the 1830s for national regulation of boilers. 
In 1838, following an extensive report by the Treasury recommending regulation, 
a call for regulation by President Andrew Jackson in his 1832 State of the Union 
 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 94. 
252. Id. at 72. 
253. Id. at 190. 
254. Id. at 81-82. It bears noting that the difference between the United States Supreme Court and 
the New York Court of Errors did not lie in the interpretation of the term “commerce.” See 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. 488, 509-10 (1820). The latter court made clear in its opinion 
that, had Congress issued a monopoly license in conflict with New York’s license, the state 
license would have given way. Id. The outcome turned on the difference in interpretation of 
the reach of the 1793 licensing act, Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305. Id. Both courts took 
for granted that “commerce” would of course include regulation of navigation. 
255. Robert Gudmestad, The Horrific Accident that Created the Regulatory State, BLOOMBERG  
(Jan. 31, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-01-31/the-horrific 
-accident-that-created-the-regulatory-state [http://perma.cc/4AB6-BKAJ]. 
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Address to Congress,
256
 and three horrific boiler explosions, Congress finally 
acted with the passage of the Steamboat Act of 1838.
257
 
Some have heralded the Act as the beginning of comprehensive regulation of 
commerce, but contemporaries quickly came to view it as ineffective because it 
lacked an enforcement mechanism.
258
 In 1852, Congress amended the Steamboat 
Act, replacing “the three-page, thirteen-section statute that it had passed in 1838 
[with a] bill contain[ing] forty-three sections and r[unning] fourteen pages in 
the statutes at large.”
259
 Most importantly, the 1852 Amendment created a Board 
of Supervising Inspectors to not only regulate steamboat safety, but also facilitate 
public engagement in that regulation through the petition process.
260
 This nine-
member commission met annually to set rules and regulations for the inspectors 
of steamboats and for the steamboat pilots and masters.
261
 Although seemingly 
regulatory in nature, Board procedure often blurred the lines between regulation 
and adjudication.
262
 The Board “often described its rules as responding to peti-
tions or complaints from outside parties.”
263
 By 1858, the Board formally set 
aside “time at its annual meeting to hear orally from petitioners.”
264
 Early Board 
meetings resembled congressional petition procedure as the Board received pe-
titions and responded to them through ad hoc committees or through delibera-
tion of the whole Board.
265
 
The regulation of steam-powered rail followed a similar path to that of 
steam-powered boats. It began with the development of infrastructure through 
the congressional petition process, and moved into the construction by statute 
of a commission to regulate and process petitions as to how that infrastructure 
would be used. A review of the Congressional Petitions Database revealed a 
 
256. Andrew Jackson, President of the U.S., Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 4,  
1832), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29474 [http://perma.cc/MYC4 
-FELS]. 
257. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304. 
258. See MASHAW, supra note 17, at 187-208. 
259. Id. at 192. 
260. Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 98, 10 Stat. 38.; see also MASHAW, supra note 17, at 192. 
261. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 193-94. 
262. Id. at 196-200. 
263. Id. at 203. 
264. Id. 
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steady increase in petitions for rail infrastructure between the 1820s and 1830s.
266
 
Petitioners prayed for exemptions from duties on iron imports, the construction 
of railways by the federal government, grants of timberland to supply timber, 
and for subscriptions of railroad stock. But most often, petitioners prayed for 
land. The steady westward expansion of the United States and the displacement 
of native peoples through aggressive removal policies had increased the public 
landholdings of the federal government.
267
 Rail companies turned to Congress 
with petition and hat in hand, and the length of United States railroad track be-
gan to grow.
268
 
Much like the regulation of steamboats in exchange for licenses, Congress 
began its regulation of rails with an investigation and reporting scheme contin-
gent on the receipt of federal subsidy. By 1878, when Congress established the 
Office of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts within the Department of the Interior, 
most railroads fell squarely within the Act’s jurisdiction.
269
 The 1878 Act gave the 
Auditor of Railroad Accounts the power to investigate the railroads and report 
to the Secretary of the Interior, while the railroads were required to make their 
books available and provide all prescribed reports.
270
 Mashaw has noted the sim-
ilarities between the investigatory and reporting power of this precursor to the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the powers of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission established by the Act.
271
 Like the 1838 Steamboat Act,
272
 the 1878 
Act lacked an enforcement mechanism and was soon decried as insufficient.
273
  
Nine years later, Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 to regulate the railroads 
and to facilitate public engagement in that regulation.
274
 The Interstate Com-
merce Commission is often described as the first independent administrative 
 
266. Although the Database recognizes particular petition topics, it is not yet refined sufficiently 
and the “prayer” field not yet cleaned sufficiently to allow automatic coding of subtopics. In-
stead, I reviewed the petitions from this period by hand for both number and substance. 
267. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED 24-25 (2012). 
268. Id. at 130-31. 
269. Mashaw, Law and the Gilded Age, supra note 24, at 1398. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 1398 n.113. 
272. MASHAW, supra note 17, at 190, 195. 
273. See id. at 244; Act of June 19, 1878, ch. 316, § 5, 20 Stat. 169, 170 (providing that fines under 
the Act could only be levied upon referral to the Attorney General). 
274. Id. at 1365 n.1 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 
1985) (“In hindsight, the development of administrative law seems mostly a contribution of 
the 20th century . . . . The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887, has been 
taken to be a kind of genesis.”)). 
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agency, and its creation is often pointed to as the birth of the American admin-
istrative state.
275
 However, as this Section illustrates, the structure of the Com-
mission was not necessarily innovative. Rather, it resembled closely the structure 
of commissions established by earlier Congresses and especially the Board of Su-
pervising Inspectors established by the Steamboat Act of 1852.
276
 Like the Steam-
boat Act of 1852,
277
 the Interstate Commerce Act established a multi-member 
commission to oversee inspection of the railroads and enforcement of the Act.
278
 
Enforcement of the Act also relied, in part, on a petition process.
279
 Specifically, 
the Act allowed individuals and organizations to petition the Commission to ad-
dress particular charges of violations of the Act or to clarify the Act.
280
 In 1888, 
the year following the Act, the Congressional Petitions Database revealed that 
petition introductions to regulate equitable rates dropped nearly to zero. 
The last few years of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the 
twentieth century were characterized by a general decline in petition volume in 
the generalist Interstate Commerce Committee, as most of the commerce peti-
tions were better served by specialized commissions.
281
 The Interstate Com-
merce Committee was one of eighteen committees that survived the 1946 Legis-
lative Reorganization Act’s reduction of House standing committees from 48 to 
19.
282
 However, petition volume in the Committee only continued to decline. 
i i i .  the participatory state  
The original meaning of the term “democracy,” coined in the political theory of 
ancient Greece, was: government by the people (demos = people, kcratein = 
govern). The essence of the political phenomenon designated by the term was 
the participation of the governed in the government, the principle of freedom in 
 
275. Id. 
276. Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61. 
277. Id. 
278. An Act to Regulate Commerce (Interstate Commerce Act), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 386 (1887). 
279. Id. at § 13; Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy,” supra note 24. 
280. Id. 
281. Although the general trend is decline, this period in the Congressional Petitions Database saw 
heavy variation in petition volume due to high volume petition campaigns on matters of pub-
lic interest. For example, the 55th Congress experienced a surge in petitions regarding the 
regulation of the interstate shipping of cigarettes, interstate shipping of gambling materials, 
and an anti-scalping bill for railroad tickets. 
282. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 121(a), 60 Stat. 812, 826; David 
C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48, 55 
(1994). 
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the sense of political self-determination; and this was the meaning with which 
the term has been taken over by the political theory of Western civilization. – 
Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy (1955)
283
 
Out of the petition process, Congress has constructed what I designate the 
“participatory state.”
284
 Because of shortcomings in the models on which much 
of our public law theory is grounded, public law scholarship has often neglected 
the existence and function of the participatory facets of our government. Exca-
vation of the petition process, however, reveals the architecture of the participa-
tory state more clearly. 
This Part draws out the lessons of the history of petitioning for our under-
standing of the participatory state. Section III.A grounds the historical narrative 
in emerging and established theories on governance and participation—the work 
of Heather Gerken and Hans Kelsen, respectively. Section III.B then takes these 
lessons and offers friendly amendments to legal process theory. 
A. Naming the Participatory State 
As Part I described, from the Founding onward, Congress responded to in-
dividual petitions through a formal, public, and equal process that resembles lit-
igation more closely than politics. Congress constructed by statute boards and 
commissions that were not clearly within one single branch of government, and 
it made law not in isolation, but in consultation with individuals and minorities 
affected by those laws. Many aspects of our government that seem of ambiguous 
constitutional status—the Court of Claims, public benefit programs, and such—
have their roots in the petition process in Congress, and were born of Congress’s 
efforts to satisfy its obligations under the Petition Clause. The making of specific 
laws, public or private, thus involved a process closer to adjudication. Congress 
passed laws of general application in response to petition campaigns. Even once 
legislation was passed, the lawmaking process reflected an understanding that 
 
283. Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, 66 ETHICS 1, 3 (1955). 
284. The participatory state responds also to Jody Freeman’s call for a new administrative law 
agenda that reflects upon “how governance depends heavily on private participation.” Jody 
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 673 (2000). In modern 
administrative governance, Freeman documents “a deep interdependence among public and 
private actors in accomplishing the business of governance.” Id. at 547. According to Freeman, 
it is this interdependence that animates the legitimacy crisis in administrative law and Free-
man roots a new concept of administration, that of a “set of negotiated relationships,” in order 
to recognize this interdependence and resolve the legitimacy crisis. Id. at 548. In essence, Free-
man proposed nearly twenty years ago a form of the participatory state and a similar move 
away from a strictly Weberian view of administration. 
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laws of general applicability could affect various populations differently and, 
thus, Congress created exceptions and amendments in response to petitions.
285
 
The historical petition process problematizes the belief that our modern no-
tion of strict separation of powers had any real place in early American lawmak-
ing. Engagement with the public through the petition process took many forms, 
not all of them clearly delineated as adjudicative, legislative, or executive. This 
history demonstrates that a deeper understanding of our legislatures and legis-
lative process has much to contribute to the study of public law generally beyond 
the specific field of legislation. 
Understanding the historical petition process and its role within the lawmak-
ing process helps identify a countermajoritarian function of the administrative 
state other than technocratic governance. From the Founding, one of the pri-
mary functions of Congress was to consider and process petitions submitted by 
the public. The petition process thus preserved the ability of individuals and mi-
norities to participate in the lawmaking process outside of the majoritarian 
mechanism of the vote. Congress afforded these politically powerless petitioners 
equal, public, and formal process, even when they were not enfranchised. As the 
size of the public grew and the forms of participation became specialized to par-
ticular regulatory areas, Congress constructed new commissions and boards to 
facilitate continued public participation. By building these myriad commissions 
and boards, Congress preserved a vital aspect of the lawmaking process: a for-
malized voice for individuals and minorities. 
In short, understanding the historical petition process helps to define the 
wide range of innovative forms of governance created by Congress over the last 
two hundred years. The contours of the so-called “Fourth Branch” are more dif-
ficult to define than its critics admit, as its actual infrastructure lives within the 
executive, the legislature, and the courts, as well as places in between. This in-
frastructure also performs a range of functions beyond that of “administration,” 
 
285. The similarities between the petition process and the dynamics of equity bear further reflec-
tion. Aristotle defined equity (epieikeia) as a force that intervenes into “law where law is de-
fective because of its generality.” ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 112 (Robert C. Bart-
lett & Susan D. Collins eds., 2011). The petition process functioned, in part, as a mechanism 
to allow individuals and minorities the ability to seek redress for injustice in a specific appli-
cation of a general law. The specific connection between petitioning and equity has yet to be 
fully articulated, but scholars have begun to draw a connection between equity and the peti-
tion dynamics at work within the administrative state. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Equity and 
Administrative Behaviour, in EQUITY AND ADMINISTRATION 326 (P.G. Turner ed., 2016) (“At its 
widest, we can label as ‘equity’ any intervention that corrects the law when it is defective ow-
ing to its generality . . . . This tradition stands behind one variant of the ‘equity of the statute,’ 
and it formed the backdrop to the desire for flexible expert administration in the early twen-
tieth century.”). 
petitioning and the making of the administrative state 
1603 
including adjudication and regulation. By naming these innovative forms of gov-
ernance as the “participatory state,” rather than the “administrative state,” we can 
better map their place and function. 
Today, the participation of individuals and minorities takes place through 
procedures within the specialized boards, commissions, and agencies that com-
prise the administrative state—in particular, the notice and comment rulemaking 
process and the petitions required by the APA. Under the APA, agencies offer a 
petition process for rulemaking and undergo notice and comment on proposed 
regulations.
286
 But as the case studies illustrate, the participatory state spans 
more broadly than the “administrative state,” encompassing the courts—includ-
ing specialized courts like the Court of Claims—and Congress. As for the latter, 
the modern Congress has attempted to facilitate participation in lawmaking 
through our current lobbying system. But, as I have argued elsewhere, these at-
tempts fall short of ensuring the public, equal, and formal participation pro-
tected by the Petition Clause.
287
 
Finally, understanding the historical petition process allows us to better un-
derstand the role played by the participatory state within our republican democ-
racy. Libertarian critics of the administrative state decry these innovative forms 
of governance as rights-invading communitarian outgrowths of the Progressive 
Era, foreign to our Founding documents. However, understanding the myriad 
federal commissions, agencies, and boards as loci for public participation in the 
lawmaking process challenges the libertarian narrative. Congress constructed 
these new forms of governance not as a Weberian bureaucracy but rather as a 
means to protect individual rights—particularly the right to petition—and indi-
vidual liberty. Liberty in this sense is Kelsenian.
288
 It encompasses more than 
simply freedom from regulation; it also encompasses freedom to participate 
equally in making the laws by which one is governed.
289
 The mechanism of the 
vote ensures the participation of the majority through a majoritarian decision 
rule. In fostering participation for individuals and minorities, the participatory 
state functions as supplement to the majoritarian vote and ensures equal lib-
erty.
290
 In this way, these innovative forms of governance actually further the lib-
ertarian project by ensuring equal liberty and democratic legitimacy through 
their facilitation of participation. 
 
286. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
287. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1198-1204. 
288. HANS KELSEN, THE ESSENCE AND VALUE OF DEMOCRACY 26-33 (Nadia Urbinati & Carlo In-
vernizzi Accetti eds., Brian Graf trans., 2013). 
289. Id. at 28. 
290. Id. at 58 (discussing the petition as a mechanism of representation similar to the vote). 
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Moreover, contrary to the proponents of libertarian administrative law, this 
vision of liberty and of republican democracy is not twentieth-century commu-
nitarianism, but rather part and parcel of our Founding culture. The Founding 
generation viewed petitioning as an integral component of a republican form of 
government and codified the value of minority participation into the Petition 
Clause. In constructing the participatory state, Congress translated that petition 
right into innovative forms of governance.
291
 As the population grew, along with 
its demands, so too did Congress’s ability to meet its citizenry’s participation de-
mands through the creation of the participatory administrative state. 
As noted above, in addition to protecting the rights and liberty of individu-
als, the participatory state also plays an important role in protecting democratic 
legitimacy by empowering minority lawmaking. The theory of the participatory 
state therefore joins a growing body of scholarship that identifies and examines 
these structural protections for minorities throughout government.
292
 Most no-
tably, recent work by Heather Gerken documents the structural protections for 
minorities at work within state and local government and celebrates “the power 
wielded by agents within our Tocquevillian bureaucracy.”
293
 
But minorities wield power at the federal level as well. The participatory state 
expands Gerken’s framework to encompass minority empowerment at the na-
tional level, including the petitioner’s power to force the majority to engage 
through our Tocquevillian bureaucracy. So, too, here are the “discursive benefits 
of structure” at work within the petition process in Congress and the myriad 
commissions, boards, and agencies that constitute our modern state.
294
 Local 
structures, in Gerken’s words, “giv[e] political outliers an opportunity to force 
engagement, set the national agenda, [and] dissent from within rather than 
complain from without.”
295
 Similarly, political outliers force engagement, set the 
agenda, and voice dissent from within the petition process.
296
 Beyond the often 
 
291. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1189-1211 (1993) (outlining a 
theory of constitutional interpretative fidelity based on “translation” from the original inter-
pretative context to the present); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 396-410 (1995) (justifying the New Deal reforms as part of 
this translation, which adapted old understandings to a new social reality); Lawrence Lessig, 
Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1371-76 (1997) (further explicating the the-
ory of constitutional translation as a process that preserves interpretative fidelity). 
292. See supra note 39.  
293. Heather K. Gerken, Abandoning Bad Ideas and Disregarding Good Ones for the Right Reasons: 
Reflections on a Festschrift, 48 TULSA L. REV. 535, 537 (2013). 
294. Gerken, New Nationalism, supra note 39, at 1894. 
295. Id. at 1895. 
296. See supra Part I. 
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ineffective soapbox offered by speech protections, the participatory state pro-
vides a certain amount of power to minorities to engage in lawmaking. 
B. Updating Our Lawmaking Models 
An excavation of the petition process also affords us the opportunity to in-
terrogate some of the models that operate in the background of our public law 
scholarship, many of which contribute to the ongoing “crisis” over the legitimacy 
of administrative lawmaking. After all, we cannot determine whether it violates 
the Constitution when Congress creates commissions and boards unless we have 
some model of how legislatures ought to legislate and what constitutes delega-
tion. Nor can we determine whether one of those commissions or boards violates 
the separation of powers by comingling executive, judicial, and legislative func-
tions unless we have a model of what constitutes executing, adjudicating, and 
legislating. 
Comprehensive models of the lawmaking process have become less common 
as the world of legal scholarship has become more siloed.
297
 Increasingly, schol-
ars focus their attention on a single institution in government: scholars of federal 
courts and civil procedure focus on the courts, administrative law scholars study 
the agencies and the APA, and election law scholars focus on state and federal 
elections. Even constitutional law, the traditional home of more comprehensive 
theories, has become a house divided between the study of structure and the 
study of rights.
298
 Structuralists focus on the distribution of power, while rights 
scholars study the protection of liberty and equality—leaving neither to study 
the lawmaking process overall and how those structures and institutions might 
also contribute to the protection of equality and liberty. Few theories within the 
legal academy offer a comprehensive view of the lawmaking process or offer 
models of those lawmaking institutions in action and collaboration. This Section 
documents how legal process theory—perhaps the last comprehensive model re-
maining—fails to incorporate petitioning into its theory of lawmaking. 
 
297. See e.g., Paul J. Stancil, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: A (Short) Manifesto on the Necessity 
of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (“The various branches 
or ‘silos’ of legal academic thought remain rather distressingly segregated and, in some cases, 
almost definitionally opposed to one another.”). 
298. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1293 (2012) (“A conventional 
divide in constitutional law separates structure from rights. . . . But the rights/structure dis-
tinction is in many ways misleading.”). 
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1. Legal Process Theory: Lawmaking Without Petitioning 
Recent scholarship has documented the reemergence of legal process theory, 
a shopworn but highly respected theory of the lawmaking process within both 
the academy and the courts that applies across a range of areas, including statu-
tory interpretation, federal courts, administrative law, and legislation.
299
 Legal 
process theory has had a longstanding hold on public law scholarship generally 
and particularly on debates over relationships between lawmaking institutions. 
Most notably, it fostered the extended debate over the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty,
300
 which continues to haunt the judiciary despite sustained criticism.
301
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Legal process theorist John Hart Ely advanced an enduring model of judicial re-
view with his contribution to that debate.
302
 Within the field of administrative 
law, legal process theory is experiencing a recent renaissance, as administrative 
law scholars connect the institutionalist focus of their field with its legal process 
theory roots.
303
 The field of legislation has long acknowledged and celebrated its 
debts to the legal process school. And modern critics of the administrative state 
work within the legal process framework in advancing their attacks. 
Legal process theory took hold in the years after the Second World War.
304
 
At its creation, the fathers of the theory, Henry M. Hart and Albert Sacks, aimed 
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to chart a middle ground between the schools of legal realism and legal formal-
ism that had dominated debates over the nature of law during the first half the 
twentieth century.
305
 Hart and Sacks eschewed the naïve simplicity of formalism 
and accepted the basic premise of legal realism that legal principles do not alone 
bind judges.
306
 But in crafting legal process theory, they offered a defense of 
democratic lawmaking against the legal realist charge that lawmaking was nec-
essarily arbitrary and political, and lacked any form of restraint on the individual 
exercise of power.
307
 
Hart and Sacks saw institutional architecture as the means by which to con-
strain individual lawmakers—even when the letter of the law might not.
308
 Law 
was legitimate not because it transcended legal institutions, but because it arose 
from them and was made according to accepted procedures within those insti-
tutions.
309
 Setting acceptable procedures and then creating law pursuant to those 
procedures provided, to Hart, the core of democratic legitimacy: “[D]ecisions 
which are the due result of those [institutional] processes must, by that fact 
alone, have a moral claim to acceptance.”
310
 Hart and Sacks offered a view of the 
law as a system that existed within and between institutions of varied functions 
and they constructed models of each of those institutions, including legisla-
tures.
311
 These models describe institutions through their different functions 
and often convey a greater sense of the separation of powers than existed histor-
ically.
312
 
The legal process theory contains one glaring omission. The legislature of 
legal process theory structures government, manages appropriations, and over-
sees the executive through the making of laws.
313
 According to Hart and Sacks’s 
model, however, the legislature ought not facilitate public engagement other 
than through the electoral process. In other words, the legislature of legal process 
 
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 
1958). 
305. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2032-33. 
306. Id. at 2037-38. 
307. Id. at 2038-40. 
308. Id. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. at 2040 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., Note on Some Essentials of a Working Theory of Law 
(revised, n.d.), in PAPERS OF HENRY M. HART, JR., Box 17, Folder 1, 36 (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library)). 
311. 1 HART & SACKS, supra note 304, at 1-9. 
312. Id. at 183-89. 
313. Id. at 186-88. 
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theory does not exist to ensure participation of individuals and minorities.
314
 
While Hart and Sacks discuss briefly the private claims system and “private” leg-
islation, they declare that “these trivia” fall within the province of the courts and 
the administration.
315
 Nowhere do the models of the legislature, or the executive 
for that matter, mention the petition right or the participation of individuals and 
minorities during the lawmaking process beyond claims petitions.
316
 To the con-
trary, they offer only some strong and largely critical language regarding lobby-
ing.
317
 
2. Amending Legal Process Theory 
The history revealed by this Article suggests that in addition to overseeing 
the structures of government through the making of laws, legislatures also must 
ensure the participation and representation of the public during the lawmaking 
process. They can do so by preserving and maintaining the petition right. More 
than a mere extension of the vote, the original petition process protected the 
ability of individuals and minorities to seek redress of their grievances before 
their government. As Justice Story remarked nearly two hundred years ago, the 
right to petition is fundamental to a republican form of government.
318
 A legis-
lature of republican design is not simply majoritarian—it offers mechanisms for 
participation by the majority and the minority through both the vote and the 
petition process. A government must protect both mechanisms in order to main-
tain the legitimacy of its lawmaking process. 
The authors of legal process theory may have simply overlooked petitioning. 
Legal process theory came of age in the 1950s and 1960s after the LRA disman-
tled the last vestiges of the petition process.
319
 The Legal Process teaching materi-
als reflect an ignorance of this lost history. In particular, Hart and Sacks’s com-
mentary on the triviality of private bills and criticism of lobbying, coupled with 
a total omission of the petition right, dates the piece to a time when the petition 
process had fallen out of favor in Congress.
320
 Moreover, neither Hart nor Sacks 
 
314. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2049-51. 
315. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 701. 
316. See 2 HART & SACKS, supra note 304, at 1006-12 (discussing the use of private bills to resolve 
claims petitions). 
317. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 804-10. 
318. See 2 STORY, supra note 1, § 1894, at 645. 
319. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 4, at 2040-42. 
320. See supra Section I.D.2. 
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had actually spent much time working in Congress. Their models, while sophis-
ticated, reflected no firsthand experience with the lawmaking process. Both Hart 
and Sacks had worked in the executive branch, long after the New Deal vision of 
the administrative state as bureaucratic and technocratic regulator had sup-
planted any memory of the petition process.
321
 
But the omission also reflects a fundamental flaw at the heart of legal process 
theory. As William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey explain, legal process theory 
failed to address considerations of representation generally, and particularly rep-
resentation of individuals and minorities in the lawmaking process: 
Chapter 4 of The Legal Process, in fewer than fifty pages . . . , provided no 
more than a glimpse at direct democracy, the election of public officials, 
and reapportionment. For example, the chapter expresses doubts about 
the judicial capacity to force reapportionment, especially where a federal 
court order concerns a state legislature. In “Note on the Relation Between 
the Voters’ Choice and the Determination of Public Policy by the Legis-
lature,” Hart and Sacks considered the responsiveness of elected officials 
to public preferences but did not concern themselves with the “Carolene 
question,” namely, whether discernible groups with demonstrably less 
power in the political process should receive any judicial protection 
against legislation that disadvantages them.
322
  
Most controversially, the teaching materials for The Legal Process, crafted in the 
1950s, omitted any mention of Brown v. Board of Education.
323
 
The omission of Brown reflected Hart and Sacks’s commitment to a strict 
proceduralism that accepted any law passed by proper procedures as legitimate, 
no matter how unjust the law or the lawmaking procedures.
324
 This formalist 
stance came into direct conflict with the civil rights movement of the 1960s, 
which demanded increased participation for aggrieved minorities.
325
 In its re-
fusal to provide any normative vision or constitutional requirement regarding 
the representation of minorities, legal process theory failed to respond to those 
long excluded from the very institutions that legal process theory celebrated.
326
 
 
321. ERNST, supra note 14, at 62; Edward A. Purcell. Jr., Henry Melvin Hart, Jr., in THE YALE BIO-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 255-56 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). 
322. HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at cxi n.272 (citations omitted). 
323. Id. at cvi. 
324. Id. at cxi. 
325. Id. at cvi-cxiii. 
326. Id. 
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Hart and Sacks’s careful work was soon thoroughly rejected by scholars of critical 
legal studies.
327
 
Incorporating petitioning and the petition right into our models of lawmak-
ing could remedy this fundamental flaw in legal process theory. An understand-
ing of petitioning could reinvigorate the proceduralist vision of democracy at the 
heart of legal process theory, but in such a way that recognizes the importance of 
minority participation and protection. Frickey, Eskridge, and others have criti-
cized the strict proceduralism of legal process theory for its lack of any normative 
baseline to evaluate procedures, many of which have historically excluded mi-
norities.
328
 Some have argued that proceduralism is itself the flaw.
329
 
But as political theorists Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati describe, 
proceduralist democracy could provide the normative baseline necessary to dis-
tinguish good process from bad process.
330
 Saffon and Urbinati argue that pro-
ceduralist democracy—that is, a vision of democracy that sees proper process as 
paramount over proper outcomes—is the best means of protecting “equal liberty 
in a context of pluralism and dissent.”
331
 Proper procedures should accommo-
date various and often competing visions of the good, and allow for fair and eq-
uitable resolution of those disputes through formal process.
332
 But in order for 
proceduralism to protect equal liberty, lawmaking procedures must protect equal 
participation, including minority participation through mechanisms other than 
the majoritarian vote.
333
 Petitioning provides one such mechanism. 
iv. petitioning within the administrative state  
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to ad-
ministrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of 
the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the 
right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. – California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
 
327. William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal 
Process School Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 710-17 (1987). 
328. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at cvi-cxiii. 
329. Id. 
330. Saffon & Urbinati, supra note 39, at 443-45. 
331. Id. at 442. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
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A. The Administrative State Within Our Constitutional Framework 
The flaws of the legal process theory have practical implications for the con-
temporary assault on the administrative state. Indeed, scholars have documented 
a recent resurgence in direct and indirect structural challenges to the administra-
tive state, and these simple models are often at the heart of this resurgence. 
Gillian Metzger recently declared the administrative state as “under siege” from 
challenges to restrictions on presidential power over administration, administra-
tive adjudication, and congressional delegation—all motivated by separation of 
powers concerns.
 334
 Simple legal process models animate this attack. Contem-
porary critics invoke unreconstructed tripartite models to define “legislative,” 
“judicial,” and “executive” power—often without nuance or explication.
335
 They 
often express discomfort with any activities by one branch that resemble, as de-
scribed by the simple tripartite model, the activities of another branch. Moreo-
ver, because critics rely on these simple models, they find so-called delegations 
of these powers deeply suspect, and they ground these suspicions with textual 
arguments. Originalist or libertarian critics often point to the Vesting Clauses of 
Article I and Article II, assuming that “vested” means non-delegable. Drawing 
upon the simple legal process models, critics presume that the public’s only check 
on national power is the vote. In this view, the lack of oversight by a branch with 
an electoral process presumably leaves agencies, boards, and commissions “un-
accountable.” In these and many other ways, legal process theory has cemented 
a strict view of the separation of powers at odds with the history of petitioning. 
The following sections describe the critics and their models, and provide a case 
study of how incorporating petitioning into these simple models could reshape 
doctrine around the structure of the administrative state. 
 
334. Metzger, supra note 5, at 8. 
335. To provide a few examples, Justice Thomas, concurring in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 
invoked a simple model of the three branches and their strict separation as “core principles of 
our constitutional design, essential to the protection of individual liberty.” 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, dissenting from Mistretta v. United States, ac-
cused the majority of condoning the creation of “a sort of junior-varsity Congress” in allowing 
for the creation of an independent sentencing commission within the judiciary. 488 U.S. 361, 
427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge Ginsburg, architect of a strand of libertarian admin-
istrative law, invoked the simple model to criticize abandonment of the non-delegation doc-
trine following the New Deal in his speech to the Cato Institute. Douglas H. Ginsburg, On 
Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 CATO S. CT. REV. 16-17. 
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1. The Critics and Their Models 
The simple models of legal process theory are ubiquitous throughout the 
federal courts. The Supreme Court often struggles to articulate coherent theories 
and to create public law around these simple models. Chief Justice Roberts, a 
noted practitioner of legal process theory,
336
 recently provided an apt illustration 
of the difficulties of the simplistic model in practice.
337
 In Arizona State Legisla-
ture v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Chief Justice Roberts dis-
sented from the Court’s holding that “legislature” in the Elections Clause could 
mean the people of Arizona, who had formed through initiative an independent 
redistricting commission.
338
 The majority turned to dictionaries to define “leg-
islature” as “the power that makes laws.”
339
 Chief Justice Roberts writing in dis-
sent struggled to explain exactly why this definition was insufficient.
340
  He 
turned first to the seventeen other references to a state legislature in the Consti-
tution and pointed out inconsistencies with the majority’s holding. How could 
the people in Arizona take a legislative recess?
341
 How can all of the people of 
Arizona have a “most numerous branch”?
342
 When trying to define “legislature” 
directly, however, Chief Justice Roberts stumbled.
343
 The Chief Justice resorted 
to leaning heavily on the notion of representation, distinguishing his “legisla-
ture” from the Court’s as “the representative body which ma[kes] the laws of the 
people.”
344
 But what exactly he meant by “representative body” was never made 
clear. 
Chief Justice Roberts has applied similarly simple models to support chal-
lenges to the administrative state. He took a lead role in the attack on the admin-
istrative state in his majority opinion in King v. Burwell—an opinion that sum-
marily rejected any deference to administrative interpretation of the Affordable 
Care Act.
345
 Although Chief Justice Roberts did not articulate in great detail in 
 
336. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of 
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 66 (2015). 
337. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
338. Id. at 2671 (holding that “the people may delegate their legislative authority over redistricting 
to an independent commission just as the representative body may choose to do”). 
339. Id. 
340. Id. at 2680-81 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
341. Id. at 2681. 
342. Id. at 2680. 
343. Id. 
344. Id. 
345. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). 
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King why deference was inappropriate for significant questions, he had signaled 
discomfort with administrative deference previously. His reasoning on this issue 
relied heavily on the simple tripartite legal process model of lawmaking. In City 
of Arlington v. FCC, Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent with the simple 
model: “One of the principal authors of the Constitution famously wrote that 
the ‘accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’”
346
 Modern 
administrative agencies, according to Chief Justice Roberts, exercise legislative 
power by “promulgating regulations with the force of law,” exercise executive 
power by “policing compliance with those regulations,” and exercise judicial 
power by “adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions.”
347
 It was 
the absence of a strict separation of powers in administrative agencies and the 
“danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state” that moved 
Chief Justice Roberts to dissent against deference.
348
  His dissent addressed 
nothing about the specific constitutional arrangement of the agency at issue. Ra-
ther, it took the form of many modern critiques in framing its critique in general 
terms: “the claim is that the whole thrust and purpose of modern administrative 
government deviates from the Framers’ separation of powers design.”
349
 
Although frequently cast in originalist terms, judicial discomfort with the 
administrative state often derives from consequentialist fears that lack of ac-
countability will lead to intrusions into individual liberty.
350
 These concerns, 
however, reflect the simplistic notions of accountability and liberty emanating 
from the legal process model. According to these critics, the Framers formulated 
a strict, tripartite separation of powers to hold government accountable through 
the vote, thereby avoiding intrusions into liberty. As Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
for the Court in Free Enterprise Fund: 
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern them-
selves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive 
Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect 
of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s 
control, and thus from that of the people.
351
 
 
346. 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (J. Cooke 
ed., 1961)). 
347. Id. at 312-13. 
348. Id. at 315. 
349. Metzger, supra note 5, at 45-46 (footnote omitted). 
350. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 44. 
351. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). 
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Policing the boundaries of this tripartite framework is not simply formalism for 
formalism’s sake; rather, any transgression leaves the government able to intrude 
broadly into private life by avoiding public accountability through the vote. To 
these critics, the primary, if not the only, accountability mechanism against in-
trusions into personal liberty is the power of the franchise. 
The “siege” on the administrative state by the courts has been supported by 
attacks from the academy. Legal process’s simple tripartite model of separation 
of powers also underlies many contemporary academic attacks on the adminis-
trative state. Libertarian critics decry that “[t]he post-New Deal administrative 
state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to noth-
ing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.”
352
 Gary Lawson and others 
have not minced words in leading the charge to reclaim what they envision as 
our lost constitutional framework.
353
 In a prominent, albeit extreme, example, 
Philip Hamburger compared administrative adjudication and administrative 
rulemaking to oppressive practices of royal prerogative in Britain like the Star 
Chamber and the High Commission.
354
 
Academic attacks are largely framed in originalist terms, lamenting the lack 
of an explicit constitutional basis for the administrative state. These critics cite 
the New Deal as the point when our constitutional framework deviated from 
original intent.
355
 Richard Epstein, for example, highlights not simply a consti-
tutional moment, but a sharp break between “Our Two Constitutions” during 
the 1930s.
356
 Our original Constitution, according to Epstein, “says absolutely 
nothing about the existence, let alone the organization and regulation, of these 
administrative agencies.”
357
 The structure of these agencies “represents a con-
scious and complete inversion of the principle of separation of powers.”
358
 Citing 
the “death of constitutional government,” Gary Lawson describes a Constitution 
that restricted the powers of the national government to those enumerated in the 
constitutional text.
359
 Crucially, he locates this restriction in the Vesting Clauses’ 
enumeration of powers as distinctly legislative, executive, and judicial, and as 
resting in separate spheres of government.
360
 However, according to Lawson, 
 
352. Lawson, supra note 16, at 1231 (footnotes omitted). 
353. Id. 
354. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 135, 462 (2014). 
355. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 1-71 (2014). 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 39. 
358. Id. 
359. Lawson, supra note 16, at 1233. 
360. Id. at 1237-38. 
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pragmatic concerns over the ability of our national government to govern have 
caused us to abandon our Constitution, because we tell ourselves that “Congress 
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.”
361
 
Few defenders of the administrative state have confronted its critics on their 
own terms. Instead, they have most often pushed back on the movement’s un-
derlying presumptions: strict constitutional construction, and a national gov-
ernment of limited, enumerated powers.
362
 Of course, critics of the administra-
tive state would respond that these defenders are guilty of choosing the 
administrative state over the Constitution.
363
 But even accepting critics’ textual-
ist premises, the longstanding function of petitioning within the legislative pro-
cess poses some fundamental challenges to their critiques. 
First, petitioning complicates the simplistic notion of legislative power de-
scribed by the tripartite model of separation of powers. From the Founding, the 
petition process within Congress resembled more closely adjudication than the 
legislative power envisioned by the simple tripartite model. Yet the Founding 
generation and the Founding Era Congress envisioned petitioning as an integral 
aspect of lawmaking and interpreted the vested powers to encompass petition-
ing. From the very first days of the young Congress, individuals submitted peti-
tions in the form of formal documents, like complaints, and Congress institu-
tionalized procedures to respond.
364
  By contrast to the Star Chamber, the 
petition process was public; petitions were read on the floor and each step in the 
petition process was made part of the formal record. Denial of a petition was not 
a “legislative act” that required bicameralism and presentment, and could be 
completed by the decision of a single committee.
365
 Granting a petition could 
result in general legislation, passed through the traditional legislative process.
366
 
But it could equally result in a private bill or even the decision of an agency, 
board, or commission.
367
 
 
361. Id. at 1241 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)). 
362. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 667 (1984); see also Adrian Vermeule, No, A Review of 
Is Administrative Law Unlawful by Philip Hamburger, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015). 
363. Lawson, supra note 16, at 1241. 
364. See supra Section I.C. 
365. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. 
367. See, e.g., supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
petitioning and the making of the administrative state 
1617 
This practice did not end with the Founding generation. Petitions dominated 
Congress’s docket until well into the twentieth century.
368
 Much of this process 
did not fall squarely into the tripartite model categories of legislative, executive, 
or judicial. Congress would investigate and find facts to resolve petitions, often 
involving the executive and the judiciary—both state and federal—to assist in 
that process.
369
 It is unclear whether this process of working out the application 
of a general rule to particular cases is itself a legislative or an executive act. But 
both Congress and the executive created exceptions and amendments to general 
rules in response to petitions, much like the administrative state does today.
370
 
In related fashion, excavating the institution of petitioning problematizes a 
different aspect of the strict separation of powers described by the tripartite 
model: that each branch operates in isolation. From its earliest days, Congress 
drew on the assistance of the other branches to process petitions, both to support 
Congress in providing due process to petitioners and to run the petition process 
independently.
371
 Also from the beginning, Congress expressed concerns over its 
own internal capacity to provide petitioners due process.
372
 In order to facilitate 
and protect the right to petition, Congress constructed through statute innova-
tive forms of governance that could afford petitioners due process and could scale 
to meet the demands of a growing population.
373
 One of the earliest examples 
arose from the First Congress with the statute that created the Patent Board, the 
precursor to the Patent and Trade Office and one of the earliest administrative 
commissions.
374
 Petitions for patents had historically been resolved through the 
passage of private bills, for which the Constitution required bicameralism and 
presentment.
375
 With ratification still a recent memory, the Patent Board re-
solved petitions for intellectual property without private bills. Rather, the Board 
could issue a patent upon a simple majority vote of the three-member Board and 
the signature of the President.
376
 Congress saw the creation of boards, commis-
sions, agencies, and courts to process petitions as necessary to meet its obligation 
to protect the petition right.
 
 
368. See supra Figures 3 and 4. 
369. See supra Section II.A. 
370. Again, the similarities here between the petition process and that of the dynamics of equity 
bear noting. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra Section II.B. 
372. See supra Part II. 
373. See supra Section I.B. 
374. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text. 
375. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra Section II.C. 
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From the Founding period onward, members of Congress rarely raised con-
cerns over separation of powers in creating these innovative forms of govern-
ance.
377
 Instead, they expressed an obligation to protect the petition process, a 
process seen as fundamental to lawmaking, and the right to petition, a right seen 
as fundamental to liberty. The petition process, like much of the institutional 
history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, therefore complicates the 
simple model of separation of powers that Lawson has inferred from the Vesting 
Clauses.
378
 Lawson’s interpretation of the Vesting Clauses, even under the strict-
est textualist and originalist terms, is likely much too narrow. 
Last, excavating the institution of petitioning problematizes the simple no-
tion of accountability derived from the tripartite model. Congress saw petition-
ing as an integral part of the lawmaking process because it recognized the neces-
sity of engaging with the public directly during lawmaking.
379
  As outlined 
above, because political power was not a prerequisite to participation in the pe-
tition process, petitioning provided a mechanism for individual and minority 
participation. Individuals and minorities could petition, even if they could never 
persuade or even garner the attention of an electoral majority. In this way, the 
petition process served as a complement to the purely majoritarian mechanism 
of the vote.
380
 Petitioner grievances included a range of harms incurred by gov-
ernment policy, natural disaster, or private deprivation.
381
 Through the petition 
process, Congress grappled with the complexities of general laws and the unin-
tended consequences of applying general laws to a large and heterogeneous pub-
lic.
382
 Libertarian critiques of the administrative state overlook petitioning and 
the important function it served as a mechanism of representation.
383
 These crit-
ics are less reliant on textual arguments about the Vesting Clauses, but they nev-
ertheless argue that the administrative state is a headless extra-Constitutional 
leviathan, wholly unaccountable to the people through the electoral process.
384
 
These concerns about a deficit of electoral accountability inspire judicial in-
vocations of the non-delegation doctrine. For example, Justice Kennedy recently 
noted the “unique constitutional position” of administrative agencies in his call 
 
377. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
378. See Lawson, supra note 16, at 1238. 
379. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
380. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
381. See supra Section II.A. 
382. See supra Section II.B. 
383. See Metzger, supra note 5 (summarizing the libertarian critique); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, 
supra note 9 (same). 
384. See Ginsburg, supra note 335, at 16-17. 
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to limit agency discretion, because “[i]f agencies were permitted unbridled dis-
cretion, their actions might violate important constitutional principles of sepa-
rations of powers and checks and balances.”
385
 Libertarians see the non-delega-
tion doctrine as an important check on administrative power because the 
electorally accountable Congress must limit the agencies’ discretion with an in-
telligible principle.
386
 However, such concerns rest on the presupposition that 
voting is the only mechanism of representation within our republican form of 
government. Understanding the petition process as a meaningful mechanism of 
representation for individuals and minorities on par with the vote could provide 
an alternative means of accountability for the agencies. In particular, the Petition 
Clause’s quasi-procedural due process right could be used to hold agencies ac-
countable by forcing them to engage with the public, consider input, and re-
spond. It is possible that the procedural due process requirements of the petition 
right could provide sufficient mechanisms of accountability to calm libertarian 
concerns. For example, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Fox went on to offer the 
procedural protections of the APA as a partial solution to his concerns over 
agency accountability and non-delegation.
387
 
The administrative state is “under siege” by direct and indirect structural 
challenges in large part because of concerns over its constitutional status. Locat-
ing and identifying the origins of the administrative state in the petition process 
can begin to situate, on firmer historical and constitutional footing, the admin-
istrative state within our constitutional framework. By understanding the func-
tion of the petition process and the petition right, critics could begin to move 
away from the overly simplistic tripartite models of legal process theory. From 
the Founding, petitioning has performed an integral function within our law-
making process, both in facilitating the participation of individuals and minori-
ties in lawmaking and providing an important mechanism of representation to 
supplement the vote. Congress saw building the infrastructure of the adminis-
trative state as necessary to provide petitioners due process and to protect the 
right to petition. As an outgrowth of the petition process, the administrative 
state now performs the important functions of the petition process.
388
 
 
385. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
386. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 415. 
387. Fox, 556 U.S. at 537 (“[T]he APA was a ‘working compromise, in which broad delegations of 
discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural safeguards.’” 
(quoting Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1193, 1248 (1982))). 
388. It bears noting that the Supreme Court has already recognized that the petition right extends 
to administrative agencies. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 
(1972). This recognition, however, was not grounded in the historical relationship between 
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2. A Case Study in Correcting the Models: The Legislative Veto 
In the well-known case of INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that Sec-
tion 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, a so-called “legislative 
veto” provision, was unconstitutional.
389
 The Immigration and Naturalization 
Act set a general rule that all foreign nationals would be deported for having 
“remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted.”
390
 It also au-
thorized the Attorney General to make exceptions to the general rule upon peti-
tion by an individual for a deportation suspension.
391
 Without further action by 
Congress, the Attorney General’s grant of a petition for deportation suspension 
was final.
392
 Section 244(c)(2) of the Act, however, required the Attorney Gen-
eral to report all petitions granted to the House of Representatives, which could 
overrule or “veto” the Attorney General’s grant of a petition through the passage 
of a resolution.
393
 
The Supreme Court struck down this arrangement, grounding its holding in 
a putatively originalist understanding of the separation of powers. Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the Court, held first that the legislative veto provision was an 
Article I legislative act in that “Congress has acted and its action has altered 
Chadha’s status.”
394
 Drawing upon an 1897 Senate Committee Report that doc-
umented longstanding congressional practice, the Court defined an Article I leg-
islative act as an act that “contain[s] matter which is properly to be regarded as 
legislative in its character and effect.”
395
 Further, the Court held that the Consti-
tution includes an enumerated and exclusive list of four contexts where Congress 
may engage in a legislative act without bicameralism and presentment: the ini-
tiation of impeachments, conducting a trial following an impeachment, the ap-
proval or disapproval of presidential appointments, and the ratification of trea-
ties.
396
 It is unclear from the Court’s opinion how it determined that this list was 
 
the petition process and the administrative state. Id. At the time of these decisions, this history 
was not before the Court. The full contours of the extension of the Petition Clause to the 
administrative state have yet to be articulated. 
389. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983). 
390. Id. at 923 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)). 
391. Id. at 923-924 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)). 
392. Id. at 925. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. at 952. 
395. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 1335, at 8 (1897)). 
396. Id. at 955. 
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exclusive and not simply illustrative.
397
 But because a legislative veto of the grant 
of a petition was nowhere enumerated, the Court held Section 244(c)(2) uncon-
stitutional.
398
 
Interestingly, in reaching its holding that the veto was a legislative act, the 
Court recognized that the petition process established by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act was once part of the “private bill procedure” or petition pro-
cess.
399
 “After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill pro-
cedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, 
and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens 
to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances.”
400
 But any recogni-
tion of the dynamics of the petition process stopped there. The Court concluded 
that the delegation of the petition process was itself a legislative act, and there-
fore Congress could not amend that delegation without another legislative act.
401
 
The Court disregarded that Congress’s delegation of the petition process was 
itself conditioned with the veto.
402
 Justice Powell’s concurrence fared no better 
in arguing that the legislative veto was unconstitutional as a usurpation of judi-
cial power. His opinion protested that, because Congress had made specific de-
terminations regarding six individual cases, “[i]t thus undertook the type of de-
cision that traditionally has been left to other branches.”
403
 
Examining INS v. Chadha through the lens of the petition process would di-
rect a different outcome. Like many other statutes before it, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act provided a mechanism to process petitions on a particular 
subject: here, petitions for the suspension of deportation. This process was quite 
consistent with historical practice. From the Founding, Congress often estab-
lished rules of general applicability, like that of the general deportation rule, and 
then allowed for exceptions to that general rule through the petition process.
404
 
Significantly, a petition denial never required Congress to pass a bill—a so-called 
legislative act. It was only the grant of petitions that often, but not always,
405
 
 
397. Id. 
398. Id. at 959. 
399. Id. at 954. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. at 955 (“Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legisla-
tively altered or revoked.”). 
402. Id. 
403. Id. at 965 (Powell, J., concurring). 
404. See supra Part I. 
405. Congress often directed executive behavior through simple resolution. See Fisher, supra note 
44, at 277. 
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required the passage of a bill, either public or private.
406
 Committees at the 
Founding often declined petitions without passing any bill or even a resolution, 
and they often declined to act on favorable reports from the executive.
407
 
Founding Era practice thus undermines the Court’s reasoning in Chadha 
based on the simplistic conception of the separation of powers. The denial of a 
petition was either not a legislative act or it was a legislative act that did not re-
quire bicameralism and presentment.
408
 Congress oversaw the work of the exec-
utive through the petition process and the Legislative Reorganization Act only 
strengthened this oversight function.
409
 The Court should not have held the leg-
islative veto in this context unconstitutional. 
Congressional practice following Chadha undermined its holding. The leg-
islative veto, a mechanism in place since the 1930s in thousands of statutes, ap-
parently outlived the Supreme Court’s handiwork in Chadha. In 1993, Louis 
Fisher reported that Congress had enacted more than 200 legislative vetoes since 
the Court held the practice unconstitutional.
410
 Chadha also drove the legislative 
veto underground into “informal and nonstatutory understandings” between 
congressional committees and executive agencies.
411
 As an integral component 
of the petition process and of Congress’s ability to oversee executive involvement 
in that process, the legislative veto seems to have outlived even the Supreme 
Court’s best efforts. This persistence can be understood as the extension of a 
historical requirement of congressional oversight to ensure petition rights in the 
participatory state. 
B. Participatory Administrative Law 
Beyond defending the administrative state against structural challenges by 
constitutional critics, a deeper understanding of the participatory state would 
also lead to amendments to current administrative law doctrine. The cramped 
version of the horizontal separation of powers embraced by legal process theory 
and adopted by contemporary originalists has not only led to structural chal-
lenges, it has also influenced important administrative law precedents. This sec-
tion considers a line of doctrine—administrative due process—that would bene-
fit from incorporating notions of the participatory state. 
 
406. See supra Part I. 
407. See supra Part I. 
408. See supra Part I.  
409. See supra Part I.B. 
410. Fisher, supra note 44, at 277. 
411. Id. at 288. 
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As described in Part I, the First Congress institutionalized a formal petition 
process within its parliamentary procedures and its recordkeeping. Congress 
then oversaw implementation of the petition process within the courts and 
within agencies, boards, and commissions. In ratifying the Petition Clause, the 
Founders codified formal, public, access to the lawmaking process.
412
 The peti-
tion process originated in Congress, but Congress has over time expanded the 
process by statute to the executive and judicial branches. For the agencies, the 
APA codified these practices into its formal procedural protections that included 
an administrative petition process and the requirement of notice and comment 
rulemaking.
413
 In this way, the APA guaranteed and specified the petition right 
in the same way that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guaranteed procedural 
due process. 
Without naming the petition right explicitly, administrative law doctrine has 
long recognized the quasi-procedural due process right of the kind promised by 
the Petition Clause. For example, in Morgan v. United States (Morgan II),
414
 the 
Supreme Court mandated that “administrative proceedings of quasi-judicial 
character” satisfy “the fundamental requirements of fairness” that structure ju-
dicial proceedings.
415
 In Morgan II, that “fundamental fairness” required a hear-
ing that comported with traditional notions of due process.
416
  Chief Justice 
Hughes, writing for the Court, did not root the source of the “fundamental fair-
ness” requirement in constitutional text—the Due Process Clause or otherwise. 
Rather, the Court rested its holding in the structure of the administrative ar-
rangement and the need to preserve public trust in its processes.
417
 An under-
standing of petitioning, from which many of these administrative processes 
grew, justifies the concerns over fairness animating the Court in Morgan II. 
Moreover, the Petition Clause could provide additional structure and direction 
to administrative due process doctrine. 
 
412. See McKinley, supra note 27, at 1147-53. 
413. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2012). 
414. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1 (1938). Issued on April 25, 1938, Morgan II 
formed part of the legal process trifecta that included Carolene Products, of footnote four fame, 
and Erie. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court issued all three opinions on the same day. Notably, 
each aimed to ensure minority protection through structure and proceduralism: Carolene 
Products through judicial oversight of the political process; Erie through the protection of fed-
eralism; and Morgan II through the protection of individuals petitioning the administrative 
state. 
415. Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 14-19. 
416. Id. 
417. Id. at 14-15. 
the yale law journal 127:1538  2018 
1624 
Over the last fifty years, concerns over “fundamental fairness” have driven a 
“due process revolution,” as the courts have required ever increasing procedural 
protections for those who engage with the administrative state.
418
 Unlike the 
Court’s earlier foray into “fundamental fairness,” the recent due process revolu-
tion rests squarely in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.
419
 In a series of cases in the 1970s, litigated largely in the context 
of public benefits, the Court developed a test for administrative due process that 
embodied a utilitarianism foreign to the notion of procedural due process.
420
 
The Mathews v. Eldridge test involves complex balancing between the interest of 
the petitioner, the value of additional procedure, and the interest of the govern-
ment—including the public cost of implementing the additional procedure.
421
 
Not surprisingly, judicial review of administrative procedure under the test has 
been “intrusive,” as Eldridge placed courts in the role of second-guessing 
transsubstantive administrative procedure and determining proper procedures 
piecemeal on a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis.
422
 
One possible explanation for the failures of the Eldridge test is its develop-
ment within the context of public benefits, an area traditionally governed by the 
petition process.
423
 As Parts I and II described, from the Founding, individuals 
requested and received public benefits, usually pensions, by petitioning Con-
gress and the executive. The petition process’s guarantee of formal consideration 
and response was not rooted in Due Process Clause concerns over deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property, but rather in the Petition Clause and its preservation of 
the right to a fair, equal, and public petition process.
424
 The “fundamental fair-
ness” of Morgan II more closely captures the petition right than does Eldridge’s 
concern over benefits as property.
425
 
As it stands, the Eldridge test fails to fulfill the values reflected in the petition 
process and suffers from fundamental internal flaws. As identified by Mashaw, 
 
418. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 28 n.1 
(1976) (collecting cases). 
419. Id. 
420. Id. at 47 & n.61. 
421. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
422. Mashaw, supra note 418, at 29-30. 
423. See supra Section II.B. 
424. McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-85. 
425. Morgan v. United States (Morgan II), 304 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1938). Cf. Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 742 (1964) (analyzing the expansion of property-like rights in public 
benefits). 
petitioning and the making of the administrative state 
1625 
the value of a particular public benefit or its utility to a particular individual can-
not be determined on a case-by-case basis.
426
 Forcing a petition right into the 
text of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has produced the awkward result 
that public benefits—in Eldridge, social security payments—are property.
427
 The 
Eldridge test then asks the court to value that property for the petitioner in order 
to determine what process is due.
428
 As a result, the Eldridge test places the court 
in the position of policymaker, as it must determine the optimal design of indi-
vidual administrative programs—balancing the cost of procedures against the 
likelihood that those procedures would benefit the petitioner.
429
 
These flaws reflect the shortcomings of an administrative due process right 
grounded solely in utilitarian justification. Because Eldridge leaves courts with 
only one value to consider—i.e., overall welfare maximization—the court must 
calculate the minute tradeoffs of particular policies in each particular case. An 
administrative due process that considered values other than general welfare 
might result in a role for the courts that is less intrusive into policy details, but 
more protective of petitioners’ rights. Such reform would also answer criticism 
that the Eldridge test fails to consider many of the values traditionally found in 
procedural due process, like equality, transparency, predictability, rationality, 
and participation.
430
 
An administrative due process right rooted in the Petition Clause would re-
quire courts to review administrative procedure for equality, formality, and 
transparency only, without consideration of whether the case involved a property 
interest of a sufficient value. In this way, administrative due process would more 
closely resemble Mashaw’s theory of dignitary due process than the utilitarian 
balancing of Eldridge.
431
 Mashaw’s theory of dignitary due process envisions ad-
ministrative due process as distinct from any substantive interest, focusing in-
stead on the protection of participants’ dignity through proper procedures.
432
 
Although he does not make the connection wholly explicit, Mashaw frames dig-
nity in terms of the ability to participate equally in lawmaking.
433
 Like Mashaw’s 
dignitary due process, the petition right does not promise or protect a particular 
 
426. Mashaw, supra note 418, at 47-49. 
427. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976). 
428. Id. 
429. Id. 
430. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. 
REV. 885, 899-904 (1981). 
431. Id. 
432. Id. at 922-25. 
433. Id. at 896, 922. 
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utilitarian balance, but rather safeguards equality, formality, and transparency in 
participating in the lawmaking process.
434
 
Consider, by way of illustration, Mashaw’s description of the expressive 
value of voting, as distinguished from its miniscule utilitarian value: 
Disenfranchisement in a general election carries with it a loss of political 
power so minute that cold calculation should convince us that our per-
sonal franchise is in practical, political terms valueless. Yet something—
the affront to our self-image as citizens, the sense of unfairness from ex-
clusion—has led some of us to pursue this “valueless” privilege to partic-
ipate in political decisionmaking through every available court. Involve-
ment in the process of political decisionmaking, via the exercise of a right 
to voter participation, seems to be valued for its own sake. The same may 
well be true for other processes.
435
 
The same may well be true for petitioning. From the Founding, the petition right 
offered a mechanism of participation for individuals and minorities in comple-
ment to the majoritarian mechanism of the vote. Like voting, the petition right 
is valued for its own sake. Congress built portions of the administrative state 
specifically to facilitate this mechanism of participation and to protect the right 
to petition.
436
 Developing an administrative due process right rooted in the Pe-
tition Clause would safeguard the courts’ role in reviewing administrative due 
process, but limit that role to the consideration of the values intrinsic to the pe-
tition right—that is, public, formal, and equal process.   
C. Objections 
This Section addresses two possible objections to recognizing the adminis-
trative state as a participatory state and amending administrative law in light of 
the petition right. First, proponents of libertarian administrative law might ob-
ject that they are most concerned with the administrative state’s regulation of 
markets beyond the authority granted in the Commerce Clause. The Petition 
Clause, they could argue, cannot resolve this concern. The second objection per-
tains to agency rulemaking as opposed to agency adjudication. Does the partici-
patory state theory justify lawmaking outside of the legislature without abiding 
by the strictures of Article I, Section 7? 
 
434. Id. at 899-904; see also McKinley, supra note 27, at 1182-85. 
435. Mashaw, supra note 430, at 888. 
436. See supra Part II. 
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With respect to the first objection, proponents of libertarian administrative 
law are in large part concerned with the regulation of markets by the adminis-
trative state.
437
 Those concerned with communitarian redistribution writ large 
might take little solace in viewing the administrative state as protecting the right 
to petition. Moreover, the Petition Clause alone cannot resolve concerns over 
Congress exceeding its power under the Commerce Clause. As described in Part 
II, Congress entertained petitions related to the regulation of Commerce, but 
petitioning alone could not expand the government’s jurisdiction.
438
 In fact, 
Congress often dismissed petitions for grievances outside of its enumerated 
powers to redress.
439
 Future research could explore the relationship between pe-
titioning and Commerce Clause doctrine. 
However, even if the Petition Clause does not calm concerns over the grow-
ing regulation of commerce, it at least helps separate the constitutional debate 
from a more general ideological debate over neoliberalism. It is helpful to clarify 
that the libertarians’ concern is not aimed at “big government” in the abstract, 
which we now know includes structures built to protect rights and facilitate par-
ticipation of individuals and minorities. Rather, the concerns are rooted in how 
big government operates. An understanding of petitioning could help refine this 
debate. For example, concerns over redistribution being foreign to our founding 
culture are simply false. The petition process served from the Founding as a 
mechanism to facilitate the redistribution of wealth and property to the disad-
vantaged, most notably veterans and victims of disasters.
440
 Social welfare pro-
grams are not evidence of a colonial communist culture, but are part and parcel 
of our republican form of government. If proponents of libertarian administra-
tive law nevertheless remain concerned about the constitutional question of the 
scope of the Commerce Clause power, then we ought to focus the debate there. 
With respect to the second objection, questions remain regarding whether 
the petition process underlies not only the structures of administrative adjudica-
tion, but also legislative rulemaking in the absence of bicameralism and present-
ment. Historically, the petition process was housed entirely within legislatures, 
and Congress created boards and commissions to resolve petitions elsewhere. 
Congress often resolved petitions by passing laws through the formal Article I, 
 
437. See Lawson, supra note 16, at 1231; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 393. 
438. See supra Section II.C. 
439. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY VOL. 8, supra note 84, at xv. 
440. See DAUBER, supra note 20, at 17 (“Requests for government relief of loss began in the earliest 
days of the American republic. At first, requests came from individual citizens . . . in the form 
of a memorial or petition.”). 
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Section 7 process. But the fact remains that Congress constructed so-called in-
dependent agencies to facilitate the petition process in the earliest days of the 
Republic. 
The petition process at the very least reveals complexities in the lawmaking 
process that should dictate which legislative actions are subject to the strictures 
of Article I, Section 7, and which are not. Although Congress did resolve peti-
tions through the passage of legislation, those laws were often private bills. Pri-
vate bills occupy a unique status in the lawmaking process. The historical record 
is replete with examples of Congress viewing private bills as something not truly 
legislative and potentially exempted from the requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment. Congress was quick to delegate jurisdiction over petitions calling 
for resolution by private bill, and members repeatedly decried the private bill 
process as something not meriting the attention of Congress.
441
 
Can the private bill process, a process that by definition raises the rights of 
specific parties, provide any support for agencies’ general rulemaking powers? 
Perhaps because we refer to private bills as “bills” and not judgments, we often 
create too strict a divide between common law regulation and legislative regula-
tion. The petition process, like the common law, created precedent that Congress 
drew on in resolving future petitions. In this way, private bills, like judicial opin-
ions, created general rules. In many ways, private bills prefigured the approach 
of our agencies as they adjudicate particular cases and formulate general rules 
over time. 
conclusion 
Even for those who do not subscribe to the vision of a “Constitution in Exile,” 
a sense of discomfort with the “amorphous” constitutional status of the admin-
istrative state can still be cause for concern—especially when that discomfort, as 
it often does, operates in the background of our doctrine. Naming the petition 
process and understanding its integral role within the architecture of the admin-
istrative state could alleviate some of the discomfort with administrative law-
making. Unlike institutional histories and arguments from intellectual and stat-
utory consensus, petitioning offers the loudest critics the exact salve they seek—
constitutional text. At the very least, the Petition Clause could focus and clarify 
a debate that has raged for decades, often unmoored from the history of the prac-
tices that have constituted our government from the Founding. 
In responding to critics of the administrative state, we might also develop a 
deeper and more refined understanding of our lawmaking institutions. To the 
extent that the fathers of legal process theory discussed representation at all, Hart 
 
441. See supra Sections II.B.1, II.B.2. 
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and Sacks confined themselves to a narrow exploration of the majoritarian mech-
anisms of the vote and of direct democracy. A conversation about the represen-
tation and participation of individuals and minorities within the lawmaking pro-
cess is long overdue. Relegating the protection of minorities to the rights side of 
the Constitution ignores the complex structures by which individuals and mi-
norities wield power and participate in making the laws that govern them. Em-
powerment and participation preserve a democratic value distinct from the sub-
stantive outcomes that preoccupy rights theorists. Recognizing this important 
value would strengthen our lawmaking models. 
There is a role for the field of legislation in reforming these models. In con-
trast to most other administrative histories, this Article has told the story of the 
administrative state from the perspective of Congress. For scholars of govern-
ment structure—even those concerned with the rights of minorities—Congress 
has a greater role to play in the legal academy. Scholars of legislation can ensure 
that role is recognized. Legislation carries the legacy of its predecessor, legal pro-
cess theory, and the field of legislation has evolved over the years with an explicit 
recognition and embrace of those intellectual roots. Scholars of legislation must 
ensure that the theory does not again neglect the representation of minorities. 
Recognition of the petition process and the vitality of the participatory state 
could provide an early step in remedying this neglect. 
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methods appendix  
This Article draws upon the Congressional Petitions Database developed by 
our research team at the North American Petitions Project in the Harvard De-
partment of Government. The Congressional Petitions Database, which I have 
worked with a team to assemble, is the first comprehensive database of petitions 
submitted to the federal Congress. The Database is an amalgam of two datasets 
drawn from the Congressional Journals and the Congressional Record respectively 
to create a comprehensive database of all petitions introduced to the Congress 
from the Founding until 1950 for the Senate and from the Founding until 2013 
for the House of Representatives. The first dataset is drawn from the Journals 
and consists of all petitions introduced to both chambers from the Founding in 
1789 until 1875. The second dataset is drawn from the Record and consists of all 
petitions introduced to the Senate from 1882 until 1948 and all petitions intro-
duced to the House of Representatives from 1882 until 2013. Because the meth-
ods used to build each portion of the Database vary, the following describes each 
dataset in turn before describing limitations of the Database as a whole. Finally, 
this Appendix briefly touches upon the archival materials from the early Con-
gresses drawn upon by the Article and, in some instances, published here for the 
first time. 
A. The Journals Dataset 
To create this dataset, we used a digitized version of the Congressional Jour-
nals, the formal published record of the daily proceedings of Congress that are 
produced by the clerk’s office of both chambers. The Journals consist of a sum-
mary of the day’s proceedings in Congress, including bill introductions and 
other forms of legislative action. Although the Journals have been kept continu-
ously since the Founding to the present, a digitized version of the Journals is cur-
rently available from the Founding only until 1875. As a consequence, this por-
tion of the Database tracks petition introductions for the first one hundred years 
or the first approximately fifty Congresses. 
By excavating the legislative record of each chamber, we were able to over-
come the need to aggregate an immense amount of archival materials necessary 
to fully capture the volume of petitioning activity in Congress over time. These 
archival materials are often not available in digitized or machine-readable format 
and some have been lost to fire or other disaster. However, because the petition 
process in Congress required each petition introduction to include a full reading 
of the petition on the floor of each chamber, a summary of each petition and 
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subsequent action on that petition became part of the Journals.
442
 Summary pe-
tition introductions from the Journals generally included the names of the pri-
mary petitioners, the residence of the petitioner, the prayer of the petition, and 
the initial disposition of the petition. A petition introduction extracted from the 
Journal of the First Congress illustrates: 
  A petition of the tradesmen, manufacturers, and others, of the town 
of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, whose names are thereunto sub-
scribed, was presented to the House and read, stating certain matters, 
and praying an imposition of such duties on all foreign articles which can 
be made in America, as will give a just and decided preference to the la-
bors of the petitioners, and that there may be granted to them, in com-
mon with the other manufacturers and mechanics of the United States, 
such relief as in the wisdom of Congress may appear proper. 
  Ordered, That the said petition be referred to the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union.
443
 
Summary petition introductions from 1789 until 1875 exceeded 145,000 in 
number, which made hand-coding these introductions unmanageable. Instead, 
we built and implemented an algorithm that both locates and extracts petition 
introductions from the Journals. We developed a methodology for the algorithm 
that relied upon supervised learning. Over a two-year period, a team of human 
coders (undergraduate students, law students, and Ph.D. students) located and 
extracted petition introductions from over two hundred randomly selected days 
from the Journals. The human coders would also code for each petition a series 
of fields from petitioner name, demographics, geography, referrals, subsequent 
legislative procedures, and petition topics. Oftentimes at least two human coders 
coded each randomly selected day with a third human coder functioning as a 
tiebreaker. From these hand-coded data, we developed a training dataset that 
instructed the petitions algorithm to better locate petition introductions and to 
identify information within those petition introductions. Eventually, we refined 
the algorithm to identify more petition introductions in the Journals than those 
identified by the human coders and to create an even more accurate dataset than 
that created by hand. 
 
442. We initially began work on our Database with a combination of the Annals of Congress and the 
Register of Debates. However, we soon discovered that these sources consistently resulted in an 
undercount of petition introductions. Even our initial tests on the Journals resulted in a peti-
tion introduction count of two to three times the number documented in the Annals and the 
Register. 
443. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (Apr. 11, 1789). 
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We also refined the algorithm to classify each petition into a particular topic. 
To develop this aspect of the algorithm, we relied on our supervised learning 
approach by having human coders classify petitions into a set of thirteen mutu-
ally exclusive categories.
444
 The human coders classified 1,650 petitions overall. 
We then trained an ensemble classifier on the hand-coded petitions and used the 
resulting model to predict the topics for the remaining petitions in the Database 
(more than 100,000 count) for the House of Representatives only.
445
 We pre-
dicted these topics by using the text of each petition description from the Jour-
nals. For each petition description, we removed the numbers and punctuation, 
put all characters in lower case, removed stopwords, stemmed the document, 
and stripped any remaining whitespace. With the cleaned petition description, 
we then created a document term matrix for each petition. We removed infre-
quently used words and then normalized the word frequencies. 
Using the document term matrix, we then trained the ensemble classifier on 
the hand-coded petitions and used the results to predict the category for the not-
yet coded petitions. The ensemble classifier consists of two different classifiers: 
a random forest model and a support vector model.
446
 To classify each petition, 
each classifier yields a predicted probability that a petition falls into a specific 
category. We averaged the results from each classifier to yield a single predicted 
probability for each petition. 
To create exclusive categories of petitions, categorizing each petition into a 
single one of the thirteen possible categories, we performed thirteen independ-
ent binary classifications. For example, for the category “INFRASTRUCTURE 
/ TRANSPORTATION,” we placed all coded petitions that fell in this category 
into the “on-topic” category and all other petitions into the “off-topic” category. 
We then ran the classifiers on the training set of petitions and recovered pre-
dicted probabilities for the full set of petitions in the sample. We repeated this 
process for each of the thirteen categories. As a result, for each petition we actu-
ally estimated the predicted probability that it was on the topic of each of the 
thirteen categories. To make our prediction, we placed the petition into the cat-
egory with the highest predicted probability. 
The classification procedure performed well. To test the accuracy of classifi-
cation using this method, we initially trained the model on 1,200 of the 1,650 
 
444. The categories are: “INFRASTRUCTURE / TRANSPORTATION,” “MILITARY / NAVY,” 
“PENSIONS,” “TARIFF / TAX,” “PUBLIC LANDS / TERRITORIES,” “CLAIMS,” “EX-
PENDITURES,” “FINANCE / BANKING / ECONOMY,” “CIVIL RIGHTS / SLAVERY,” 
“FOREIGN AFFAIRS,” “JUDICIARY,” “LABOR,” and “REGULATION.” 
445. In future development of the Database, we will undertake a similar analysis for the Senate. 
446. For details on the models, see TREVOR HASTIE ET AL., THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARN-
ING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2009). 
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total coded petitions, and then we made predictions on the remaining 450 peti-
tions. By comparing our prediction to the petitions coded by our human coders, 
we assessed the performance of the classification procedure implemented. Across 
all categories, the classifier placed the petition in the correct category 84% of the 
time. 
In summary, the Journals dataset yielded 145,892 petition introductions for 
both chambers during the eighty-six-year period from the Founding in 1789 un-
til 1875, when the digitized version of the Journals ends. 
B. The Record Dataset 
To create this dataset, we used a digitized version of the Congressional Record, 
the formal published record of the in-depth daily proceedings of Congress. The 
Record in general includes far more in-depth information on the daily legislative 
activity in Congress than the Journals, including verbatim transcripts of speeches 
and debates. The Record began publication in 1873. However, the first few years 
of the Record do not keep a thorough enough record to draw upon for petition 
introductions. To avoid systematically undercounting petitions from this period, 
the Congressional Petitions Database limits use of this dataset until after 1883. 
We have currently located and extracted petitions from the digitized version of 
the record from 1883 until 1948 for the Senate and from 1883 until 2013 for the 
House of Representatives.
447
 
For this dataset, we again exploited the procedural step in the petition pro-
cess. Petition introductions required reading the petition on the floor of each 
chamber, thereby making the petition introduction part of the formal record of 
Congress. Similar to the Journals, the Record recorded summaries of petition in-
troductions that included the name of the primary petitioners, their residence, a 
summary of the prayer of the petition, and initial petition disposition. Petition 
introductions in the Record commonly appear as a series of introductions clus-
tered together in a many sequential paragraphs. A petition introduction section 
extracted from the Record of the 68th Congress illustrates: 
  Mr. JONES of Washington presented a petition of sundry citizens of 
Ballard, Wash., praying for the passage of legislation granting adequate 
compensation to postal employees, which was referred to the Committee 
on Post Offices and Post Roads. 
  He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Seattle, Wash., pray-
ing for the passage of House bill 4123, for the reclassification of postal 
 
447. Future development of the Database will complete petition location and extraction for the 
Senate until 2013. 
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salaries, which was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post 
Roads. 
  He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Walla Walla, Wash., 
praying for the adoption of the so-called Mellon tax-reduction plan, 
which was referred to the Committee on Finance. 
  He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Walla Walla, Wash., 
praying an amendment to the Constitution regulating child labor, which 
was referred to the Committee on Judiciary. 
  Mr. LADD presented the petition of Zach Shackman and 77 other cit-
izens of Berlin, N. Dak., praying for an increased tariff on wheat and re-
peal of the drawback and milling-in-bond provision of the so-called 
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, which was referred to the Committee on 
Finance. 
  He also presented the petition of Ed. Mack and 75 other citizens of 
Lewistown, Mont., praying for increased tariff duties on wheat, flour, 
flax, and linseed oil, which was referred to the Committee on Finance.
448
 
We developed an independent algorithm to locate and extract petition intro-
ductions in the Record. The algorithm first identified the section in the Record 
that contained petition introductions for that day. It would then identify the first 
petition introduction recorded in that section and then it would cycle through 
the remaining petitions.
449
 It would continue to cycle through the remaining pe-
titions until no further petition introductions remained. For each petition intro-
duction, the algorithm extracted the name of the primary petitioner, the text de-
scription of the prayer of the petition, and the initial petition disposition by 
using regular expressions. The initial petition disposition would extract the par-
ticular legislative action, most commonly a referral or tabling, and would extract 
the name of the entity to whom the petition was referred, either a committee or 
the executive. The algorithm also extracted geographic data on the petition using 
a combination of natural language processing and regular expressions. 
In summary, the Journals dataset yielded 348,116 petition introductions for 
both chambers during the period from 1883 until 1948. The Journals dataset also 
yielded 16,010 petition introductions for the House of Representatives from 
1949 until 2013 for a total of 364,126 petition introductions. 
 
448. 65 CONG. REC. 1549 (1924). 
449. This dataset also benefitted from the additional procedural requirement that implemented a 
unique numbering system for all petitions submitted to the House of Representatives after 
1920. 
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C. Limitations 
Together, the Journals and Record datasets constitute the Congressional Peti-
tions Database, the largest and most comprehensive database of petitioning ac-
tivity in Congress ever created. The Database yields 510,018 petition introduc-
tions and documents over two hundred years of legislative activity. Although 
there is much here to be celebrated, there are also some notable limitations that 
bear mention. 
First, the Database lacks panel data for the eight-year period from 1875 until 
1883. This postbellum period could prove crucial for studying in-depth the pe-
titioning activity around the Reconstruction Amendments and other advocacy 
efforts following the Civil War. However, as described, digitized versions of con-
gressional records for this period are lacking. The digitized version of the Jour-
nals ends in 1875 and the Record does not begin dependably until 1883. Although 
digital versions of the Annals and the Register are likely available for this period, 
we found these sources systematically undercount petition introductions by 
comparison to the Journals. We aim to fill this gap in our panel data either by 
locating an alternative, more dependable source for tracking legislative activity 
for this period or by locating a digitized version of the Journals that extends past 
1875. Until then, however, this Article omits these data entirely from its analysis. 
Second, the Congressional Petitions Database currently combines datasets 
developed with two distinct methodologies, each developed to differing levels of 
rigor. In particular, we developed the Journals dataset after creating the Record 
dataset and have improved our methodology over time. In constructing the Jour-
nals dataset, for example, we used a supervised learning approach that refined 
our algorithm with two years of hand-coded data. Although we developed and 
refined the algorithm for the Record database, we did not use a supervised learn-
ing approach. 
Third, we began our project on the Congressional Petitions Database on the 
digitized version of the Record relied upon for the Record dataset. This digitized 
version is a proprietary version of the Congressional Record sold by Westlaw. 
Westlaw built the digitized version of the Record with an optical character recog-
nition conversion of scans of the Congressional Record documents. Optical char-
acter recognition of scanned documents rarely creates clean and accurate text, 
especially when applied to historical documents. It did not create the cleanest 
database here. Even a cursory review of the digitized Record reveals occasional 
garbled text that does not lend itself to easy cleaning. In an ideal process, we 
would return to the Record to apply our later developed methodology of super-
vised learning and our more refined algorithm, including topic coding. However, 
the somewhat rough Record data does not yet lend itself to the refined work of 
the algorithm we developed with the Journals. 
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Fourth, the Congressional Petitions Database currently tracks only petition 
introduction, but further legislative activity is difficult to assess. Later procedural 
developments, like the requirement of a unique petition identifying number in 
the House of Representatives after 1920, came too late to provide a simple means 
to track activity on a single petition over time. Rather, the Journals or Record in-
clude petition introductions that are often separated by days or even months or 
years from later legislative action on that petition. The Congressional Petitions 
Database allows us to chart the volume of petition introductions in Congress for 
the very first time and it also allows us to chart initial dispositions of those peti-
tions in the form of referrals, tabling, or otherwise. By conducting individual 
searches, I am often able to locate further action on particular petitions. How-
ever, the Database does not yet allow for tracking further legislative action in the 
aggregate. We plan future development of the Database to resolve this issue. In 
particular, we plan to develop a unique identifier for each petition and to chart 
consideration and disposition of each petition over time. 
D. First Congress Archival Materials 
The Article also draws on archival materials from the first four Congresses 
housed in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. I used these materials to 
supplement the Congressional Petitions Database and the secondary literature 
on early petitioning. In particular, I aimed to deepen the understanding of the 
petition process in Congress and its institutional form with a review of the early 
record on petition procedure. Archival materials were often unavailable on mi-
crofilm and I instead reviewed the original documents. 
Among these original documents, I discovered a set of bound documents ti-
tled “Petition Books” by the archivists at the National Archives. While these doc-
uments are cited in a few summaries of materials in the Documentary History of 
the First Federal Congress, these so-called petition books are nowhere duplicated 
or described. Nor have these materials been published or described in any alter-
native publication. My reproduction in this Article of these petition books is 
likely the first publication of these materials, and the first in-depth exploration 
of their significance. 
I have begun initial research into the extent to which Congress maintained 
petition books over time by reviewing the inventory of the National Archives. 
The National Archive inventory guides for the House of Representatives note 
petition books within the clerk’s record for almost all Congresses from the 
Founding until the 83rd Congress (1953-1955). Following the 83rd Congress, the 
House could have maintained petition books, but the National Archives does not 
provide an inventory guide for this later period. The National Archive inventory 
guides for the Senate are less clear and petition books were less commonly listed 
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in the clerk’s records. In future research, I plan to locate these petition books and 
examine their scope in greater depth. 
 
